http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5033233
中國撐得過全球經濟危機嗎？
2012-05 天下雜誌 498期 作者：經濟學人
中國的經濟成長靠的，不只是出口。仰賴外債程度低、愛儲蓄、行國家資本主義的中國，反而練出得以渡過經濟危機的韌性。
全世界都在關注中國的經濟發展，中國的快速發展，確實帶來了混亂，外界擔心一連串的風波，例如歐元風暴，會不會拖垮中國的成長？不過目前看來，中國比看衰者的擔心，更有韌性。中國經濟發展的真正瓶頸，還要再等幾年才會爆發。
外界將中國視為以出口為導向的經濟典範，但這還不是故事的全貌。淨出口並非貢獻中國經濟成長的主力，機械設備的投資開支、建築和基礎設施才是關鍵，佔中國去年經濟成長的一半以上。這類由國有企業所做的投資，大多得利於隱形補貼、保護市場、以及獎勵貸款。從北方草原的鬼市，到南部沿岸的頹圮度假村，大規模投資，造成資源浪費的例子，隨處可見。
此外，經濟體制對人民並不公平。固定利率使得銀行佔盡存戶便宜，競爭障礙，使得國有企業壟斷，而恣意定價，限制在城市工作的農民入籍的戶籍制度；土地制度允許地方政府低價買下農地，許多收益最終都進了官員的口袋裡。
然而，這些為人所詬病的缺失，卻提供中國不尋常的韌性。不同於再次在歐元區發酵的風暴，中國極少仰賴外債，中國的儲蓄佔ＧＤＰ的五一％，甚至比其投資率還高，在國家主導的金融體系下，這些儲蓄，能夠妥善地處理遞延的還款與違約。
中國銀行具有高度流動性，存款多於放款，並且保持五分之一的存款準備率，這使得銀行保有打消壞帳的能力。中央政府的債務總額只佔GDP的二五％，地方政府的債務比，大約是兩倍，但顯然，中國有餘裕對任何面臨破產威脅的銀行，進行資產重組。
只是隨著人口老齡化，以及人工變得更加昂貴時，中國驚人的儲蓄率將下降，對於資本的控制，已經逐漸鬆綁，存款的報酬率已不足以滿足大家，尋求存款替代品的需求升高。
因此，中國將不得不學會如何更聰明地使用資本，這需要解除在以國企主導的市場中，對於私人投資的種種障礙，也需要減少對金融體系的呵護，以及更好的社會福利制度。
不過距離中國迫切的改革，還有一段時間。與一九九一年經濟泡沫的日本相比，儘管同樣身為債權國，但直到日本的人均所得成長到美國的一二○％時，泡沫才破滅的。如果中國的人均所得要達到此一水準，總體經濟規模將要是美國的五倍大，因此距離那天，似乎還有很長的路要走。（陳竫詒譯）
http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=13634
How strong is China 's economy?
Resilient China By The Economist Published: June 13, 2012
Despite a recent slowdown, the world's second-biggest economy is more resilient than its critics think.
CHINA'S weight in the global economy means that it commands the world's attention. When its industrial production, house building and electricity output slow sharply, as they did in the year to April, the news weighs on global stockmarkets and commodity prices. When its central bank eases monetary policy, as it did this month, it creates almost as big a stir as a decision by America 's Federal Reserve. And when China 's prime minister, Wen Jiabao, stresses the need to maintain growth, as he did last weekend, his words carry more weight with the markets than similar homages to growth from Europe 's leaders. No previous industrial revolution has been so widely watched.
But rapid development can look messy close up, as our special report this week explains; and there is much that is going wrong with China 's economy. It is surprisingly inefficient, and it is not as fair as it should be. But outsiders' principal concern—that its growth will collapse if it suffers a serious blow, such as the collapse of the euro—is not justified. For the moment, it is likely to prove more resilient than its detractors fear. Its difficulties, and they are considerable, will emerge later on.
Unfair, but not unstable
Outsiders tend to regard China as a paragon of export-led efficiency. But that is not the whole story. Investment spending on machinery, buildings and infrastructure accounted for over half of China 's growth last year; net exports contributed none of it. Too much of this investment is undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which benefit from implicit subsidies, sheltered markets and politically encouraged loans. Examples of waste abound, from a ghost city on China 's northern steppe to decadent resorts on its southern shores.
China's economic model is also unfair on its people. Regulated interest rates enable banks to rip off savers, by underpaying them for their deposits. Barriers to competition allow the SOEs to overcharge consumers for their products. China 's household-registration system denies equal access to public services for rural migrants, who work in the cities but are registered in the villages. Arbitrary land laws allow local governments to cheat farmers, by underpaying them for the agricultural plots they buy off them for development. And many of the proceeds end up in the pockets of officials.
This cronyism and profligacy leads critics to liken China to other fast-growing economies that subsequently suffered a spectacular downfall. One recent comparison is with the Asian tigers before their financial comeuppance in 1997-98. The tigers' high investment rates powered growth for a while, but they also fostered a financial fragility that was cruelly exposed when exports slowed, investment faltered and foreign capital fled. Critics point out that not only is China investing at a faster rate than the tigers ever did, but its banks and other lenders have also been on an astonishing lending binge, with credit jumping from 122% of GDP in 2008 to 171% in 2010, as the government engineered a bout of "stimulus lending".
Yet the very unfairness of China 's system gives it an unusual resilience. Unlike the tigers, China relies very little on foreign borrowing. Its growth is financed from resources extracted from its own population, not from fickle foreigners free to flee, as happened in South-East Asia (and is happening again in parts of the euro zone). China 's saving rate, at 51% of GDP, is even higher than its investment rate. And the repressive state-dominated financial system those savings are kept in is actually well placed to deal with repayment delays and defaults.
Most obviously, China 's banks are highly liquid. Their deposit-taking more than matches their loan-making, and they keep a fifth of their deposits in reserve at the central bank. That gives the banks some scope to roll over troublesome loans that may be repaid at a later date, or written off at a more convenient time. But there is also the backstop of the central government, which has formal debts amounting to only about 25% of GDP. Local-government debts might double that proportion, but China plainly has enough fiscal space to recapitalise any bank threatened with insolvency.
That space also gives the government room to stimulate growth again, should exports to Europe fall off a cliff. China 's government spent a lot on infrastructure when the credit crunch struck its customers in the West. But there is no shortage of other things it could finance. It could redouble its efforts to expand rural health care, for example. China still has only one family doctor for every 22,000 people. If ordinary Chinese knew that their health would be looked after in their old age, they would save less and spend more. Household consumption accounts for little more than a third of the economy.
Time is on my side
That underlines the longer-term problem China faces. The same quirks and unfairnesses that would help it withstand a shock in the next few years will, over time, work against the country. China 's phenomenal saving rate will start falling, as the population ages and workers become more expensive. Capital is also already becoming less captive. Fed up with the miserable returns on their deposits, savers are demanding alternatives. Some are also finding ways to take their money out of the country, contributing to unusual downward pressure on the currency. China 's bank deposits grew at their slowest rate on record in the year to April.
So China will have to learn how to use its capital more wisely. That will require it to lift barriers to private investment in lucrative markets still dominated by wasteful SOEs. It will also require a less cosseted banking system and a better social-security net, never mind the political and social reforms that will be needed in the coming decade.
China's reformers have a big job ahead, but they also have some time. Pessimists compare it to Japan , which like China was a creditor nation when its bubble burst in 1991. But Japan did not blow up until its income per head was 120% of America 's (at market exchange rates). If China 's income per head were to reach that level, its economy would be five times as big as America 's. That is a long way off.
from 椰子樹下打盹的哲學家 http://tw.blog.yahoo.com/mesg/mesg.php?type=error&key=article_not_found
