★作者简介
此文的作者【约瑟夫·奈】（Joseph Nye）是知名的美国学者（当过哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的院长），他因提出"软实力"（soft power）的理论而闻名遐迩。在上世纪末本世纪初，他先后担任过美国助理国防部长、国家情报委员会主席、副国务卿等高层职务。从他的履历可以看出——此人在美国外交界具有相当的影响力。顺便说一下：俺的网盘上分享过他写的《理解国际冲突——理论与历史》一书。
在政治派系上，他应该算【民主党】那边。（从此文可以看出）在对华战略方面，有些地方他与川普是一致滴，有些则完全不同。俺在博客评论区与读者交流时提到过：美国两党在【反中】这个大方向上早已达成一致，差别在于具体如何落实（战略上一致，战术上有分歧）。
由于临近美国大选，很多读者都在关心："假如拜登赢得2020大选，美国对华战略会出现哪些变化？"通过这篇文章可以获得某种参考（仅仅是参考，未来总是会有变数）。
★本文简介
这篇文章发表在美国国防大学（NDU）主办的《棱镜》季刊（2020年第8卷第4期），原文标题是《Perspectives for a China Strategy》，发表时间：2020年6月。官网原始出处在"这里"。
这篇文章的中文翻译发表在"国际网"（此网站隶属于"中国国际问题研究基金会"）。考虑到该网站的朝廷背景，再放一个互联网档案馆的网页存档（链接在"这里"）。
本来俺想直接贴出中文翻译，但考虑到上述网站具有【朝廷】背景，所以就多了个心眼——稍微对照了一下英文原文。结果在第1段就发现有大量的删节。既然如此，俺就把【中英文对照】逐段贴出来，并且逐一对比了删节的情况。那些比较短的删节，俺稍微补充了中文翻译；至于【大段的】删节，俺比较懒，就请大伙儿自己去看原文吧（作为本博客的读者，基本的英文阅读能力，应该是有的吧？）
为了方便大伙对照，那些翻译过程中被删节的英文原文都标注了下划线，俺个人在中译文里面插入的注释，也采用小括号和下划线，以示区分。另外，中译文里面的粗体也是俺加注滴。
★中英文对照
| 英文原文 | 中文翻译 |
|---|---|
| When the Munich Security Conference met in February 2020, China was the most frequently mentioned country, while there was an exaggerated mood of Western decline. Yet as the recent COVID-19 pandemic has shown, China has both strengths and weaknesses. Its initial censorship, suppression of feedback and curtailment of international information allowed the pandemic to develop and fester. Draconian quarantine of Wuhan curtailed its spread somewhat; followed by a government propaganda campaign to attract others to the theme that China's behavior had been benign. When the pandemic eventually subsides, however, China will be faced with the political and economic costs resulting from the exposure of both a failed public health system and an overly rigid party control system. | 2020年2月召开的慕尼黑安全会议使中国成为世界范围内最受关注的国家。与之相比，西方衰落的声音却甚嚣尘上。然而，随着新冠肺炎疫情的爆发和蔓延，中国的优势和弱点也体现得非常明显。 （编程随想注：中译文明显比原文少了很多。因为被和谐掉了一段"吐槽中国抗疫"的文字） |
| Beyond the COVID-19 crisis, we face the larger question of how to frame a strategy toward the inexorably rising China. The perennial theme of Western decline is not new, though the role of China is. Oswald Spengler opined about the decline of the West over a century ago. During the Cold War, American pundits and politicians went through several cycles of belief in declinism that featured fear of the Soviet Union. In the end, however, when it turned out to be the Soviet Union that declined many proclaimed the West triumphant. In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama wrote that humanity had reached "the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." A few years later, Samuel Huntington issued a gloomier prognosis in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that "the rise of China and the increasing assertiveness of this 'biggest player in the history of man' will place tremendous stress on international stability in the early twenty-first century."(1) Today the prevailing fear is indeed the rise of China. Accordingly the 2017 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States focuses on great power competition with China, and to a lesser extent with Russia. | 除了新冠疫情引发的危机外，美国还面临着一个更大的挑战，即如何制定一项恰当的对华战略来遏制中国崛起。"西方衰落论"是老生常谈。早在一个多世纪前，奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒就曾对西方衰落发表过见解。冷战期间，为数众多的美国学者和政治家出于对苏联的恐惧，始终秉持衰落主义的观点。但最终却是苏联率先解体，对此，许多人宣称这是西方的胜利。弗朗西斯·福山在其1992年出版的《历史的终结与最后的人》中写道，人类已经达到了"意识形态进化的顶点，而西方的自由民主政体将作为政府的最终形式得以普遍存续"。几年后，塞缪尔·亨廷顿在《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》中发表了（更为）悲观的预言："中国的崛起及其日益自信，将给21世纪初的国际稳定带来巨大的压力。"如今，中国崛起已经成为人们的普遍忧虑。鉴于此，2017版的《美国国家安全战略》聚焦与中国和俄罗斯的大国竞争。 （编程随想注：最后一句略微篡改了愿意——原文强调："美中之争"超过了"美俄之争"） |
| In a longer historical perspective, this century is witnessing not the rise, but the recovery of Asia. Western civilization did not fully flower until 1500, and before 1800 Asia (including India and Japan as well as China) was home to more than half the world's population and world economy. By 1900, however, while Asia still represented more than half the world's population its share of the global economy had fallen to only 20 percent. Meanwhile the industrial revolution in Europe and North America and their domination of the seas made Europe the center of the global balance of power—until it tore itself apart in World War I. As I wrote a decade ago, the 21st century will see the return of Asia, but Asia is much more than just China.(2) Asia has its own internal balance of power, and many Asian states welcome a Western presence to make sure they are not dominated by China.(3) | 从（更长远的）历史角度来说，本世纪我们并不是在见证亚洲的崛起，而是在见证亚洲的复兴。西方文明直到16世纪才孕育成熟，而在19世纪以前，亚洲（印度、日本和中国）拥有世界一半以上的人口和财富。直到20世纪，亚洲人口仍占世界总人口的半数以上，但其在全球经济中所占份额已降至 20%。与此同时，欧洲的工业革命及其对海洋的控制使其迅速成为世界中心，其霸主地位一直延续至一战结束。我在10年前就已经说过，21世纪将见证亚洲的回归，但亚洲不是只有一个中国。亚洲内部有着自己的力量平衡，许多亚洲国家欢迎西方的存在，从而确保自身不被中国支配。 |
| The United States became the world's largest economy at the end of the 19th century, but it was not until it tipped the outcome of World War I that it became crucial to the global balance of power. Failing to understand that balance, America retreated into isolationism, and the 1930s was a disastrous decade. Following World War II, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower avoided the mistakes of isolationism and created the institutions of what would become the Western liberal order. | 美国在19世纪末成为世界最大经济体，但其真正能够对世界力量平衡产生重大影响还要追溯到一战后。由于美国未能把握住机会，在20世纪30年代又重回孤立主义。直到二战后，在富兰克林·罗斯福、哈里·杜鲁门和德怀特·艾森豪威尔总统的努力下，美国才得以避免重蹈孤立主义的覆辙，开创了后来成为西方自由秩序的制度。 |
| Some contemporary realists believe the rise of China portends a conflict that will tear the world apart similar to the sundering of Europe in 1914. Graham Allison has warned of a "Thucydides Trap" invoking the history of the Peloponnesian War which was caused by the rise in power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. While Allison's historical cases and numbers have been questioned, his metaphor serves a useful warning.(4) Strategists must pay attention both to the rise of China and the fear it creates in the United States. | 部分当代现实主义者认为，中国崛起预示着一场撕裂世界的冲突，就像1914年欧洲的分裂。格雷厄姆·艾利森曾警告说，"修昔底德陷阱"将使类似伯罗奔尼撒战争的历史得以重现。伯罗奔尼撒战争爆发的原因，正是雅典的崛起及其给斯巴达带来的恐惧。 尽管艾利森援引的案例和数据遭受质疑，但他的观点不失为一个有用的预警。战略家必须关注中国崛起。 （编程随想注：中译文的最后一句有删节。原文应为： 战略家必须同时注意"中国的崛起"以及"中国崛起在美国造成的恐惧感"。 文中提及的"修昔底德"是古希腊历史学家，其代表作《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》对"历史、政治、外交"等诸多领域有深刻影响。俺的网盘上分享了此书的电子版） |
| Assessing Chinese Power | 对中国实力的再评估 |
| It is equally dangerous to over- or underestimate Chinese power. Underestimation breeds complacency, while overestimation creates fear—either of which can lead to miscalculation. Good strategy requires careful net assessment. Many current, gloomy projections rest on exaggerations of China's strength and Western weakness. Some observers warn that the rise of China will spell the end of the American era, but this is far from clear.(5) Nonetheless, failure to successfully cope with the rise of China could have disastrous consequences for America and the rest of the world. | 高估或低估中国实力的做法均不可取。低估容易助长自满情绪，高估容易滋生恐慌心理，而这二者均会导致误判。一项成功的战略需要进行细致的净评估。目前，大多数持悲观态度的预测都是基于对中国实力的夸大和对西方弱点的放大。部分观察人士警告称，中国崛起意味着美国时代终结，但这一点还远未明朗。然而，如果不能成功应对中国崛起，美国和世界其他国家可能会面临灾难性后果。 |
| Contrary to current conventional wisdom, China has not yet replaced the United States as the world's largest economy. Today China's economy is only about two-thirds that of the United States, and an even smaller fraction if Europe, Japan, Australia, and other Western allies are included. Measured in purchasing power parity, the Chinese economy became larger than the American economy in 2014, but purchasing power parity is an economist's device for comparing estimates of welfare, not for measuring power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, not some notional purchasing power adjustment. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in any case a very crude measure of power. For the first half of its "century of humiliation" that started with the opium wars with Britain in 1839, China had the world's largest GDP (and military) but that did not accurately describe the balance of power.(6) Per capita income gives a better index of the sophistication of an economy; American per capita income is several times that of China. | 与传统观点相左的是，中国还没有取代美国跻身世界最大经济体。目前，中国的经济规模约占美国的 2/3，如果再把欧洲、日本、澳大利亚和其他西方盟友计算在内，这个比例还要降低。如果按购买力平价（PPP）来衡量，2014年中国的经济规模超过了美国，但购买力平价只是经济学家估算福利的一种手段，不能用于衡量国家实力。（编程随想注：此处有删节。原文中举了"石油＆喷气发动机"的例子）同样，国内生产总值也是一个非常粗略的衡量指标。这就好比鸦片战争前的中国，拥有世界上最大的 GDP（和军队），但却并不能如实反映其国家实力。相比之下，人均收入能够更好地反映一个经济体的复杂程度，而美国的人均收入数倍于中国。 |
| Many economists expect China to pass the United States someday as the world's largest economy (measured as GDP in dollars), but the estimated date varies from 2030 to mid-century depending on what one assumes about the rates of Chinese and American growth, and whether either country stumbles along the projected ahistorical linear paths. Past growth rates are not good predictors. | 许多经济学家预计，中国有朝一日将超越美国，成为世界最大经济体，但具体时间从2030年到本世纪中叶不定。这主要取决于人们对中美两国经济增速的预期，以及两国能否打破历史规律相向而行。 （编程随想注：最后一句翻译不当，且有删节。原文大意是： 这主要取决于人们对中美两国经济增速的假设，以及两国是否都沿着预期的增长曲线发展。过去的发展轨迹并【不是】好的预测依据。） |
| By any measure, however, the gravitational pull of China's economy is increasing. China is now the world's largest manufacturer and the major trading partner of nearly every country in the world.(7) Not only does its growing economy support military and aid expenditures, but access to the Chinese market and its ability to set standards for that market are a significant source of political influence. | 然而，无论以何种标准衡量，中国经济的吸引力都在日益凸显。中国目前是全球最大制造国，也是绝大多数国家的主要贸易伙伴。中国不断增长的经济实力不仅为其军力发展和对外援助提供了助力，而且日益成为其扩大政治影响力的重要基础。 |
| As we have seen above, Thucydides famously attributed the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to two causes: the rise of a new power—Athens, and the fear that created in an established power—Sparta. Most readers focus on the first half of Thucydides assessment, but the second is equally important to strategic planning and more within our control. Most Sinologists properly doubt that U.S. foreign policy can prevent the rise of China's economy, but if we use our contextual intelligence well, we can avoid the exaggerated fears that could provoke a new cold or worse, a hot war. Even if China someday surpasses the United States in total economic size, that is not the only measure of geopolitical power. As we saw, the United States became the world's largest economy at the end of the 19th century, but did not become a central player in the global balance of power until three decades later in the context of World War I. Economic might is just part of the equation. | 正如我们前面所提到的，修昔底德将伯罗奔尼撒战争的爆发归结为两个原因：一是新势力雅典的崛起，二是旧势力斯巴达的恐慌。大部分读者只关注前者，却忽视了后者同样对战略规划具有重要意义。大部分汉学家对美国外交政策能够阻止中国经济崛起的观点持怀疑态度，但如果我们能够善用情境智慧能力（原译者注：指有目的地适应环境、塑造环境和选择新环境的能力），我们将有可能避免因过分恐慌而引发的新一轮冷战或热战。即便中国有朝一日在经济总量上超越美国，这也不是衡量地缘政治实力的唯一标准。正如我们所见，美国在19世纪末成为世界最大经济体，但直到30年后才借助一战这个大背景成为全球力量平衡中的核心角色。因此，经济实力只是这个等式中的一部分。 |
| In terms of military might China is well behind the United States. U.S. military expenditure is several times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years and pose new challenges to U.S. and Western forces in the region, China is not a global peer. Nor will it be able to exclude the United States from the Western Pacific so long as the United States maintains its alliance and bases in Japan. Despite its non-nuclear status, Japan anchors the first island chain and possesses a formidable military which exercises regularly with U.S. forces. Despite trade tensions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger today than it was thirty years ago at the end of the Cold War. | 就军事力量而言，中国远远落后于美国。美国的军费开支是中国的4倍（编程随想注：中译文篡改了原文，原文写的是"数倍"而不是"4倍"）。尽管中国的军力近年来不断增强，并对美国和西方在该地区的军队构成挑战，但在全球层面，中国还不是美国的对手。只要美国维持美日同盟关系，保持前沿军事存在，中国就不能将美国排除在西太平洋之外。尽管日本没有核力量，但它拥有一支强大的军队，并经常与美军举行联合演习，堪称第一岛链的支柱。虽然日美之间存在贸易摩擦，但如今的美日同盟比30年前冷战结束时还要稳固。 |
| Sometimes analysts draw pessimistic conclusions from war games played in the limited context of Taiwan. However, with China's vital energy supply lines vulnerable to American naval domination in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, it would be a mistake for China's leaders to assume that a naval conflict near Taiwan (or in the South China Sea) would stay limited to that region. | 分析人士有时会从基于台海背景下的军事推演中得出悲观的结论。然而值得注意的是，由于中国位于波斯湾和印度洋上的重要能源供应线易受美国海军控制，因此，假如中国领导人认为在台湾（或南中国海）附近海域发生的海上冲突仅仅是一场地区规模冲突，那就大错特错了。 |
| China has also invested heavily in soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Cultural exchanges and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects can enhance China's attractiveness, but the BRI is more like a successful marketing propaganda than a true Marshall Plan for the world. BRI projects range from those that promote economic infrastructure to those designed primarily to contain India.(8) Chinese soft power faces two major limits. Ongoing territorial conflicts with neighbors such as Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines make it difficult for China to appear attractive while contesting rival claims. And domestic insistence on tight Communist Party control deprives China of the benefits of civil society that European countries or the United States enjoy. Authoritarian responses to artists like Ai Wei Wei and dissidents like Liu Xiaobo, or the cultural repression in Xinjiang limit China's attractiveness in democratic societies. In measuring soft power, opinion polls as well as a recent index published by Portland, a London consultancy, ranked China in twenty-sixth place while the United States ranked near the top.(9) Ironically, Mao Tse Tung's brutal but ideological Communism in the 1960s had a far greater transnational soft power appeal. | 中国为提升软实力投入了大量资金，以期通过吸引而不是胁迫的方式来达成目的。文化交流和"一带一路"倡议有助于提升中国的吸引力，特别是"一带一路"倡议，它既包含促进经济基础设施发展的项目，也有遏制印度的目的。但该倡议终归不是世界性的"马歇尔计划"，它更像一种市场营销所用的宣传手段。 （编程随想注：此处有【大量删节】。作者指出天朝发展"软实力"所面临的几大困难。被删节的原因有可能是——这段英文提及了"刘晓波＆艾未未"这两个不可说的名字，还提及了党国在新疆干的那些破事儿） 就衡量软实力而言，伦敦波特兰咨询公司最近发布的一项指数将中国排在第26位，而美国则接近榜首。 （编程随想注：作者在本段落末尾的吐槽被河蟹了。原文是： 讽刺的是，60年代毛泽东那野蛮的共产主义意识形态与如今相比具有更大的软实力/跨国吸引力。 如果你不理解这句话的意思，俺稍微解释一下：毛腊肉发动文革的那会儿，法国的学生运动中，有不少人是【毛主义】的信徒。俺多次在博文中提醒过大伙儿：马列理论体系具有很强的【欺骗性＆忽悠性】） |
| China's huge economic scale matters; it is an inescapable fact. The United States was once the world's largest trading nation and largest bilateral lender. Today nearly one hundred countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to fifty-seven that have such a relationship with the United States. China plans to lend more than a trillion dollars for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the United States has cut back aid. China's economic success story enhances its soft power, and government control of access to its large market provides hard power leverage. Moreover, China's authoritarian politics and mercantilist practices make its economic power readily usable by the government. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. | 中国巨大的经济规模至关重要，这是一个无法回避的事实。美国曾是世界最大贸易国和最大双边贷款国。然而如今，有近100个国家将中国视为最大贸易伙伴，而与美国建立这种关系的国家只有57个。中国计划在未来十年向"一带一路"倡议中的基础设施建设项目提供超过1万亿美元的贷款，而美国则在削减援助。中国在经济上的成功提升了它的软实力，而政府对市场准入的控制则起到了强有力的杠杆作用。此外，中国的威权政治和重商主义使其经济实力很容易被政府利用。中国还将从其庞大的市场规模和海外投资及发展援助中获利。 |
| Of the seven giant global companies in the age of Artificial Intelligence (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent), three, or nearly half are Chinese. And Chinese companies dare not defy the Chinese Communist Party, rendering them tools in China's geostrategic competition toolkit. With the world's largest population, its largest internet audience, and while data resources are becoming the "new oil" of world politics, China is poised to become the Saudi Arabia of big data.(10) Overall, Chinese power relative to the United States is likely to increase. | 在人工智能时代，全球7大巨头中（谷歌、Facebook、亚马逊、微软、百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯）中有近半数来自中国。中国企业听命于执政党，这使它们成为中国地缘战略竞争的工具。中国拥有全世界最多的人口和互联网受众，在数据资源日益成为世界政治"新石油"的背景下，中国正蓄势待发，有望成为大数据领域的沙特阿拉伯。总而言之，相较于美国，中国的实力正在不断增强。 |
| American Assets | 美国拥有的资产 |
| In assessing the balance of power, it is important to remember that the United States has some long-term power advantages that will persist regardless of current Chinese actions. One is geography. The United States is surrounded by two oceans and benign neighbors that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with fourteen countries and has territorial disputes with India, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines among others. Energy independence is another American advantage.(11) A decade ago, the United States seemed hopelessly dependent on imported energy. The recent shale revolution has transformed it from energy importer to energy exporter, and the International Energy Agency projects that North America may be self-sufficient in the coming decade. Meanwhile, China is becoming ever-more dependent on energy imports, and much of the oil it imports is transported through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, where the United States and others maintain a significant naval presence. Eliminating this vulnerability will take decades. | 在进行实力评估时，需要切记，美国拥有的某些优势将不受中国影响而长期存续。首先是地理区位优势。美国被两洋环抱，且周边遍布友好邻邦。相比之下，中国虽与14个国家接壤，但与印度、日本、越南和菲律宾等国都存在领土争端。其次是能源独立优势。10年前的美国严重依赖能源进口，但近年来却依靠"页岩气革命"从能源进口国摇身一变成为能源出口国。（编程随想注：中译文遗漏了这句——国际能源署预测，北美在未来十年内可以实现能源的自给自足。）与此同时，中国对能源进口的依赖程度却不断提高，且大部分进口石油需要途径印度洋和南中国海，而美国及其盟友在上述海域保持着强大的军事存在。 （编程随想注：中译文删节了最后一句—— 中国要消除此弱点将需要数十年的时间。） |
| The United States enjoys financial power derived from its large transnational financial institutions as well as the role of the U.S. dollar. Of the foreign reserves held by the world's governments, just 1.1 percent are in yuan, compared with 64 percent for the dollar. While China aspires to a larger role, a credible reserve currency depends on currency convertibility, deep capital markets, honest government, and the rule of law—all lacking in China and not quickly developed. While China could divest its large holdings of dollars, such action would risk damaging its own economy as much as the United States. China dumping dollars might bring the United States to its knees, but it would have a similar effect on China itself. | 美国的金融实力源自其庞大的跨国金融机构以及美元的地位。在世界各国政府持有的外汇储备中，人民币仅占 1.1%，而美元则占 64%。尽管人民币渴望扮演更重要的角色，但可靠的外汇储备取决于货币的可兑换性、深厚的资本市场、完善的法治，而这些恰恰是中国的短板。尽管中国可以选择抛售其所持有的大量美元给美国造成冲击，但这种做法无疑是"杀敌一千自损八百"。 |
| Power in interdependent relations depends upon asymmetric vulnerability and there are too many symmetries in U.S.-China interdependence at this point, though that might change if there is a much more radical decoupling. Although the dollar cannot remain pre-eminent forever, and American overuse of financial sanctions creates incentives for other countries to look for other financial instruments, the yuan is unlikely to displace the dollar in the near term. | （编程随想注：本段开头部分被删节。原文是——在相互依赖的双方，权力来自于【不对称】的脆弱性。在这点上，美中的相互依赖关系中存在着太多对称的脆弱性。假如进行更彻底的脱钩，这种状况可能会改变。） （虽然）美元不可能永远占据主导地位，且美国过度利用金融制裁会刺激其他国家转而寻求替代金融工具，但人民币在短期内也不太可能取代美元的地位。 |
| The United States also has demographic strengths. It is the only major developed country that is currently projected to hold its place (third) in the demographic ranking of countries. While the rate of American population growth has slowed in recent years, it is not shrinking as are the populations of Russia, Europe, and Japan. Seven of the world's fifteen largest economies will face a shrinking workforce over the next decade and a half, including China whose population will decline by 9 percent, while the U.S. workforce is likely to increase by 5 percent. China will soon lose its first-place population rank to India, and its working age population already peaked in 2015. Chinese worry about "growing old before growing rich."(12) | 美国在人口方面也具有优势。美国是世界人口排名前十国家中的唯一主要发达国家。虽然近年来美国人口增速有所放缓，但并没有像俄罗斯、欧洲和日本那样出现持续的负增长。未来15年，全球15大经济体中的7个将面临劳动力萎缩，其中就包括中国，其人口将减少 9%，而美国的劳动力可能会增长 5%。中国人口第一的位置很快将被印度取代，而中国的劳动适龄人口在2015年已经达到峰值。中国人普遍担心"未富先老"。 |
| America has been at the forefront in the development of key technologies (bio, nano, information) that are central to this century's economic growth, and American research universities dominate higher education. In a 2019 ranking by Shanghai Jiaotong University, fifteen of the top twenty global universities were in the United States; none were in China. | 美国始终处于关键技术（生物、纳米、信息技术）领域的发展前沿，而这些技术恰恰是本世纪经济增长的核心驱动力。此外，美国的研究型院校主导高等教育。根据上海交大2019年发布的排名，全球前20名的大学中有15所在美国，而中国大学无一上榜。 |
| To challenge U.S. dominance in this domain, China is investing heavily in research and development; it competes well in some fields now, and has set a goal to be the global leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. Some experts believe that with its enormous data resources, lack of privacy restraints on how data is used, and the fact that advances in machine learning will require trained engineers more than cutting-edge scientists, China could achieve its artificial intelligence (AI) goal. Given the importance of machine learning as a general-purpose technology that affects many domains, China's gains in AI are of particular significance.(13) | 为挑战美国在尖端科技领域的主导地位，中国正在斥巨资开展研发工作。目前， |
| Chinese technological progress is no longer based solely on imitation. Although clumsily handled, the Donald Trump administration was correct to punish China for cyber theft of intellectual property, coerced intellectual property transfer, and unfair trade practices such as subsidized credit to state-owned enterprises. Reciprocity needs to be enforced. If China can ban Google and Facebook from its market for security reasons, the United States can surely take similar steps. Huawei and ZTE, for example, should not be allowed to participate in building American 5G networks. However, a successful American response to China's technological challenge will depend upon improvements at home more than upon external sanctions. | 而且，中国的技术进步不再仅仅基于抄袭和模仿。尽管处理方式欠妥，但特朗普政府对中国实施的惩罚很有必要。如果中国可以出于安全考虑禁止谷歌和 Facebook 进入其国内市场，那么美国也完全可以采取类似的措施。例如，禁止华为和中兴参与美国的 5G 网络建设。但美国要想成功应对来自中国的技术挑战，还是要更多依靠国内改善，而非外部制裁。 |
| American complacency is always a danger, but so also is lack of confidence and exaggerated fears that lead to overreaction. In the view of John Deutch, a former Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, if the United States attains its potential improvements in innovation potential, "China's great leap forward will likely at best be a few steps toward closing the innovation leadership gap that the United States currently enjoys." But notice the "if."(14) | （编程随想注：这段整个被河蟹吃掉了！） |
| Devising a Strategy | 美国的对华战略设想 |
| The United States holds high cards in its poker hand, but hysteria could cause it to fail to play its cards skillfully. When the Bill Clinton administration published its East Asian Strategy Report in 1995 to cope with the rise of China, we decided to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance well before seeking to engage China in the World Trade Organization. Discarding our high cards of alliances and international institutions today would be a serious mistake. If the United States maintains its alliance with Japan, China cannot push it beyond the first island chain because Japan is a major part of that chain. Another possible mistake would be to try to cut off all immigration. When asked why he did not think China would pass the United States in total power any time soon, the late Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew cited the ability of America to draw upon the talents of the whole world and recombine them in diversity and creativity that was not possible for China's ethnic Han nationalism.(15) If the United States were to discard its high cards of external alliances and domestic openness today, Lee could be proven wrong. | 美国手中握有王牌，但歇斯底里的情绪可能会影响出牌效果。为应对中国崛起，克林顿政府于1995年发布《东亚战略报告》，重申与日本之间牢固的同盟关系，而这种关系要远远早于中美关系的改善。如今，抛弃盟友和国际机构的做法将是一个严重的错误。如果美国维持与日本的同盟关系，中国就不能拒美国于第一岛链之外。美国可能会犯的另一个错误是试图切断移民。当被问及为何中国的综合实力不会很快超过美国时，已故新加坡总理李光耀指出，美国能够接纳全世界的人才，并充分激发他们的多样性和创造力，这在以汉族占统治地位的中国是不可想象的。 （编程随想注：本段落最后一句没有翻译） |
| As China's power grows, some observers worry we are destined for war, but few consider an opposite disruptive danger. Rather than acting like a revolutionary power in the international order, China might decide to be a free rider like the United States was in the 1930s. China may act too weakly rather than too strongly and refuse to contribute to an international order that it did not create. China knows it has benefited substantially from the post-1945, Western international order.(16) In the United Nations Security Council, China is one of the five countries with a veto. China is now the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces and has participated in UN programs related to Ebola virus containment and climate change. China has also benefited greatly from economic institutions like the WTO and the International Monetary Fund, and is a party to the 2015 Climate Accords. | 随着中国实力的增强，部分观察人士担心中美之间必有一战，但很少有人考虑与之相反的另一种危险。中国可能会像20世纪30年代的美国那样选择"搭便车"，而不是在国际秩序中成为一股革命性的力量。中国可能会表现得弱势，而非强势，并拒绝为一个并非由自己建立的国际秩序贡献力量。中国深知自身从1945年后的西方国际秩序中获益良多。目前，中国是联合国安理会五大常任理事国之一，还是联合国维和部队第二大出资国，参与过抗击埃博拉病毒、应对气候变化等联合国项目。中国还从世贸组织和国际货币基金组织等金融机构中受益，而且是2015年气候协议缔约国。 （编程随想注：约瑟夫·奈在不止一个场合表达过这样的担心——如果天朝以【示弱】的姿态隐藏自己的实力，对美国而言更危险。而俺也在多篇博文中提到过——邓矬子把【韬光养晦】当作天朝外交的基本原则；相比之下，习呆呆这个楞头青在外交方面表现得太弱智啦！） |
| On the other hand, China has started its own Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRI program of international infrastructure projects that some see as an economic offensive. China has not practiced full reciprocity as a market economy, and its rejection of a 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling regarding the South China Sea raised questions about whether China would treat its legal obligations a la carte (as the United States has sometimes done). American and allied navies' freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea remain essential to maintain this point. | 另一方面，中国启动了亚投行和"一带一路"倡议中的国际基础设施项目，此举被很多人士视为一种经济攻势。作为一个市场经济国家，中国并没有完全履行互惠原则。此外，中国还拒绝执行2016年海牙仲裁法庭关于南中国海问题的裁决，引发了国际社会关于中国能否履行其法律义务的争论。从这个角度看，美国及其盟友的海军在南中国海开展航行自由行动就显得很有必要。 （编程随想注：关于2016年的"南海仲裁案"，可参见俺在那年写的博文《扫盲＜联合国海洋法公约＞——帮你更好地解读"中菲南海仲裁案"》） |
| Thus far, China has not tried to overthrow but rather to increase its influence within the world order from which it benefits, but this could change as Chinese power grows.(17) Appetites sometimes grow with eating, and Xi Jinping's rhetoric about China as a great state suggests this could occur. The Trump administration has called China a revisionist power, but so far its revisionism has been quite moderate, unlike extreme revisionist powers such as Hitler's Germany. China is not interested in kicking over the card table but in tilting the table so it can claim a larger share of the winnings. China's growing economic power will create problems for the United States and the international order, and this friction will likely continue. The United States will have to manage alliances, networks, and institutions deftly to shape the environment in which China uses its growing power. | 截至目前，中国并没有表现出颠覆世界秩序的企图，它只不过是想通过提升自身在世界秩序中的影响力来从中获益。但随着中国实力的增强，局面可能会发生改变。特朗普政府将中国称为修正主义国家，但到目前为止，中国的修正主义相当温和，不同于希特勒德国这种极端主义国家。中国不想打破局面，只是想让局面朝有利于本国的方向发展。中国日益增长的经济实力将给美国和国际秩序带来挑战。对此，美国将不得不妥善管理其盟友和关系网，塑造应对中国崛起的有利环境。 |
| As Chinese power increases, the American-led, liberal international order will have to change. China has little interest in liberalism or American domination, but it does have a continuing interest in an "open and rules-based" world order. In the aftermath of the trade wars and COVID-19 pandemic, there is bound to be a degree of disengagement between the two countries.(18) The American approach to an open international economy will need to be adjusted for greater oversight of Chinese trade and investments that threaten its technological and national security objectives, but there is still a basis for fruitful interdependence and rules of the road to govern that independence. The West can also express its disagreement over values and human rights while cooperating on rules of the road related to matters where there are joint interests. Our values are an important source of our soft power. | 随着中国实力的增强，以美国为首的自由主义国际秩序将不得不做出改变。中国对美国主导下的自由主义提不起兴趣，但却对"开放和基于规则的"世界秩序充满好感。贸易战和新冠疫情过后，中美两国间势必会出现一定程度的疏离。美国对国际经济的开放态度需要调整，以加强对威胁其技术和国家安全目标的中国贸易和投资的监管。西方也可以表达在价值观和人权问题上与中国存在的分歧，同时在涉及共同利益的事务上加强内部合作。须知我们的价值观是软实力的重要体现。 |
| In late 2017, President Trump announced a new National Security Strategy focused primarily on great power competition with China and Russia. It provided the benefit of a wake-up call, but as a strategy to protect American security, it is inadequate. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing. Even if the United States prevails over China as a great power, we cannot protect our security acting alone. COVID-19 is only the latest example of national security challenges that cannot be met unilaterally. Global financial stability is another; it is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but we need the cooperation of others to safeguard it. And regardless of potential setbacks to economic globalization caused by trade wars, environmental globalization will increase. | 2017年底，特朗普总统发布了新版《国家安全战略》，聚焦与中国和俄罗斯的大国竞争。新战略给我们敲响了警钟，但作为一份保护美国国家安全的战略，这还远远不够。在信息革命和全球化的影响下，世界政治格局正在发生变化。即便强大如美国，也不能独善其身。新冠疫情对国家安全带来的挑战就是最好的证明。全球金融的稳定性是另一大问题，其对美国的繁荣至关重要，但美国需要与其他国家共同合作来维护这种稳定。除了贸易战给经济全球化带来的潜在不利影响外，全球环境问题也日益显现。 |
| Pandemics, climate change, and economic instability threaten all Americans, but we cannot manage these problems alone. In a world where borders are becoming more porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to cyber terrorism, we must use our soft power of attraction to develop and cultivate networks and institutions capable of addressing these untraditional challenges. | 疫情蔓延、气候变化和经济不稳定威胁着美国，但依靠美国自己的力量难以应对。当今世界，国家之间的界线越来越模糊，毒品、疾病和网络恐怖主义等可以轻易地从一国渗透到另一国，美国必须利用自己充满吸引力的软实力，开发和培塑能够应对此类非传统威胁的能力。 |
| A successful national security strategy for the United States must begin with the recognition that our size and superpower status mean we have to lead the cooperation effort. A classic problem with public goods (like clean air, which all can share and from which none can be excluded) is that if the largest consumer does not take the lead, others will free-ride and the public goods will not be produced. President Trump's National Security Strategy says little about these increasingly important transnational threats to national security. As the technology expert Richard Danzig summarizes the problem, "Twenty-first century technologies are global not just in their distribution, but also in their consequences. Pathogens, AI systems, computer viruses, and radiation that others may accidentally release could become as much our problem as theirs. Agreed reporting systems, shared controls, common contingency plans, norms and treaties must be pursued as a means of moderating our numerous mutual risks."(19) Neither tariffs nor border walls can solve these problems. Even with American leadership, success will require the cooperation of others. The United States will have to work more closely with other countries and institutions rather than in the dismissive manner of the Trump administration. | 对美国来说，必须清楚地认识到，成功的国家安全战略意味着从领导合作开始。涉及"公共产品"（编程随想注：原作者举例啥是"公共产品"——例如所有人都可享用的清洁空气。中译文遗漏了这个举例）的一个经典问题是，如果最大的消费者不带头，其他消费者就会选择"搭便车"，公共产品就生产不出来。然而，特朗普总统的《国家安全战略》几乎没有提及上述这些对国家安全日益重要的跨国威胁。正如前奥巴马总统竞选顾问理查德·丹齐格所说，"在21世纪，技术成果不仅由全世界共享，而且其影响也具有全球性。"病菌、人工智能系统、计算机病毒以及意外释放的辐射可能同样会成为美国需要面对的难题。关税壁垒和边境墙解决不了这些问题，协商一致的报告制度，以及共同的应急方案、规范和条约，才是美国应对共同风险的有效手段。即便是在美国的领导下，成功也有赖于其他国家的合作。 （编程随想注：中译文遗漏本段最后一句，不影响大意） |
| On transnational issues like COVID-19, climate change, and global economic stability power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not sufficient to think in terms of American power over others. We must also think of power in terms of the ability to accomplish joint goals which involves power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. The United States benefits if China improves its energy efficiency and emits less carbon dioxide, or improves its public health systems. In the world of the 21st century, institutional networks and connectedness are an important source of national power. In a world of growing complexity, the most connected states are the most powerful. Washington has some sixty treaty allies while China has few, but we are squandering that strategic resource. | 在新冠疫情、气候变化和全球经济稳定等跨国问题上，各国正在进行一场正和游戏。单纯考虑美国拥有的实力是不够的，还必须从实现共同目标的角度出发，将其他国家的实力纳入考虑范畴。在大多数跨国问题上，赋予他国权力可以帮助美国实现自己的目标。假设中国能够提高能源效率，减少二氧化碳排放，或改善公共卫生系统，美国也将从中受益。在21世纪，关系网也是国家实力的重要组成部分。华盛顿有大约60个盟友，而中国却寥寥无几，但美国正在浪费这些战略资源。 |
| In the past, the openness of the United States enhanced its capacity to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances. But will that openness and willingness to engage with the rest of the world prove sustainable in the populist mood currently dominating American domestic politics, or will we see a 21st century analogue to our isolationism of the 1930s? Even if the United States continues to possess greater military, economic, and soft power resources than any other country, we may not choose to convert those resources into effective power behavior on the global scene. Between the two world wars, we did not and the result was disastrous. | 在过去，美国的开放性是其建立关系网和维护与盟友关系的一大优势。但在民粹主义主导国内政治风气的背景下（编程随想注：这里所说的民粹主义应该是指川普上台之后的风气），这种开放性和与世界其他国家接触的意愿还能否延续？或者说，我们是否会看到上世纪30年代的孤立主义在21世纪重新抬头？即美国拥有比其他国家强大得多的军事、经济和软实力，但美国可能不会把这些资源转化成国际舞台上的有效行动。在两次世界大战期间，美国就没有这样做，其结果显而易见。 （编程随想注：最后一句的中译文【不】严谨，会引发歧义。俺重新转述为： 在一战后二战前的那段时间，美国重回孤立主义，其结果是灾难性的。） |
| If the key to America's future security and prosperity is learning the importance of "power with" as well as "power over," our current strategy is not up to the task. Every country puts its interests first, but the important question is how broadly or narrowly those interests are defined. Recent events have shown an inclination toward short-term, zero-sum transactional interpretations with little attention to institutions or allies. The United States appears to be stepping back from the long-term, enlightened self-interest that marked the security paradigm designed by Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower after 1945, and successfully guided us through the Cold War. The new threat to our security is not just from transnational forces like COVID-19 and climate change but from our domestic failure to adjust own attitudes to this new world. | （编程随想注：这段整个被河蟹吃掉了！） |
| Conclusion: Cooperative Rivalry | 结论：学会合作竞争 |
| Despite Russia and China's current alliance of convenience against the United States, a real alliance of authoritarian countries similar to the Axis of the 1930s or the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s is unlikely given the underlying mistrust between Russia and China and the difficulty of coordinating competing nationalist ideologies.(20) Today's alliance of authoritarians lacks the soft power appeal of the 1950s, though steps will need to be taken to counter their covert "sharp power" threat to democratic values. China makes major soft power efforts to promote its authoritarian social model through economic inducements as well as manipulation of social media.(21) However, while Maoism used to bring protesters onto the world's streets, it is unlikely that many protesters will march under the banner of "Xi Jinping Thought about Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." | 尽管俄罗斯和中国是当前对抗美国最便利的联盟，但考虑到俄中两国之间潜在的不信任感和意识形态上存在的巨大分歧，类似上世纪50年代的中苏联盟不太可能出现。（编程随想注：此处有删节。原文中把"50年代的中苏同盟"与"30年代的法西斯轴心国"相提并论）即便中俄结成盟友，也不会像上世纪的中苏联盟那样，在软实力方面具有很强的吸引力。中国为提升软实力付出了大量努力，通过经济诱导和操控社交媒体来推广其威权主义社会模式。 （编程随想注：本段最后一句被删节了，是吐槽【习包子】的。 作者在这段中认为：中俄【难以】建立同盟关系。俺在博文《聊聊"核战略的博弈模型"与"中美新冷战"》的其中一个章节也表达了类似的观点。） |
| Since the Nixon era, China and the United States have cooperated despite ideological differences. Rapid Asian economic growth has encouraged a horizontal power shift to the region, but Asia has its own internal balance of power. Chinese power is balanced by Japan, India, and Australia among others. None want to be dominated by China. The United States will remain crucial to that Asian balance of power. If the United States maintains those alliances, the prospects are slight that in the traditional interstate competition China can drive the United States from the Western Pacific, much less dominate the world. The United States holds the high cards in the traditional great power competition. The question is whether it will play them well. | 自尼克松时代以来，中美两国虽然存在意识形态上的分歧，但始终保持着合作状态。尽管亚洲地区经济的快速增长促使全球力量向该地区转移，但亚洲地区内部也在寻求一种力量平衡机制。日本、印度和澳大利亚等国都在制衡中国。没有国家希望被中国控制。美国仍将是亚洲力量平衡的关键。如果美国能够与其亚洲盟友保持同盟关系，那么在与中国展开的传统竞争中，美国很难出局。在传统的大国竞争中，盟友就是美国的王牌，关键是美国能否有效发挥其作用。 |
| The more difficult question for an effective national security strategy will be whether the United States and China can develop attitudes that allow them to cooperate in producing global public goods while competing in the traditional areas of great power competition. Exaggerated fears and worst-case analyses may make such a balanced policy impossible. The U.S.-China relationship is a cooperative rivalry where a successful strategy of "smart competition," as advocated by Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, will require equal attention to both aspects of that description.(22) But such a future will require good contextual intelligence, careful management on both sides, and no major miscalculations. That will be a hard test of the skills of our leaders. | 就国家安全战略而言，美中两国在保持大国竞争的同时，能否在全球公共产品领域开展合作是一个难题。过分恐慌和"凡事都往坏处想"可能不会促成这种平衡。归根结底，美中之间是一种合作竞争关系。因此，成功的战略就如同夏伟（Orville Schell）和谢淑丽（Susan Shirk）所倡导的"聪明的竞争"，即把竞争与合作放在同等重要的位置。但这需要良好的情境智慧能力，双方细致的自我管理，以及不出现重大误判。总而言之，这将是对美国领导人的一次重大考验。 |
| Notes (1) See Oswald Spengler, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, The Decline of the West. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. (New York, Free Press, 1992); Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996). (2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Chapter 6. (3) Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade. (New York: Harcourt, 2008). This insight provides the basis for the most plausible strategies among the four outlined (accommodation, collective balancing, comprehensive pressure, regime change) by Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, "After Responsible Stakeholder, What? Debating America's China Strategy," Texas National Security Review, February 2020. (4) Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2018). Michael Beckley challenges this analysis and argues that power transition theory is littered with false positives and false negatives. "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters," International Security, 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018), 42–43. Kori Schake argues that there has been only one case. Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). (5) See Joshua Shifrinson, Rising Titans: Falling Giants (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). (6) Michael Beckley, "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters," International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018). 22. (7) Chas W. Freeman Jr, "China's National Experiences and the Evolution of PRC Grand Strategy," in David Shambaugh, ed. China and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 56. (8) See "Special Report: China's Belt and Road," The Economist, February 8, 2020. (9) Portland Consultancy, The Soft Power 30. London, 2018. (10) Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley and the New World Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2018), 83. (11) Meghan O'Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America's Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017). (12) Adele Hayutin, Global Workforce Change: Demographics Behind the Headlines (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 2018). (13) Lee, AI Superpowers. (14) John Deutch, "Assessing and Responding to China's Innovation Initiative," in Maintaining America's Edge, ed. Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington: Aspen Institute, 2019), 163. (15) Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, September 22, 2012. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 77. (16) Ceri Parker, "China's Xi Jinping Defends Globalization from the Davos Stage," World Economic Forum, January 27, 2017; "Statement by Wang Yi," filmed February 17, 2017, Munich Security Conference, 23:41. (17) Michael Mazarr, Timothy Heath, and Astrid Cevallos, China and the International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 4. (18) I go into details in Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence with China," The Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1, (2020). 7-21. (19) This section is adapted from my book Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). (20) See Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the Russia–China Relationship Means for the World (Docklands, VIC: Penguin Random House Australia, 2017). (21) Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018). (22) Orville Schell and Susan L Shirk, Chairs, Course Correction: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy. (New York: Asia Society Task Force, February 2019). | （编程随想注：左边是英文版的注解；中文翻译【没】包含注解） |
★俺的点评
◇先聊聊【翻译】的问题
从这篇中英文照可以看出——翻译过程的删节，使得中译文千疮百孔。由于咱们天朝有非常严厉（非常变态）的审查制度。所以【墙内】的译者在翻译洋文的时候，必须随时进行自我审查，才会导致这样的结果。建议那些擅长洋文的同学，在看老外写的文章或书籍时，尽量看原文；不那么擅长洋文的同学，强迫自己多看看原著，还能提升自身的洋文水平。
顺便说一下：俺的网盘上分享了很多电子书。对于【外国作者】写的书，俺都尽可能同时分享中文版与英文版（除非俺手头没有）。
◇美国佬的优势
最近2年，俺在博客评论区与读者交流时，不止一次地引用过如下这个排比句：
控制了石油，就控制了工业；这段是从网上看到的，有人说出自基辛格。俺没有去考证出处，不确定是不是他所说。到底是谁说的，并不重要；重要的是——这段话点出了4个不同维度的【命门】。而这4个命门都完全控制在美国佬手中。
控制了海洋，就控制了贸易；
控制了货币，就控制了金融；
控制了粮食，就控制了人类。
约瑟夫·奈的这篇文章谈到了上述4个维度的前3个，但遗漏了最后一个（也是最重要的一个）。关于天朝的粮食风险，俺在《从量变到质变——中美关系40年》一文的末尾有如下这段：
在谈贸易战之前，先说一些预备知识。
1.
天朝是【排名第一】的大米和大豆进口国（除了这两项，其它农产品的进口量，俺没空细查，估计也是排前几名）。
与天朝相反，美国是最大的粮食及农产品出口国（没有之一）。
2.
天朝是主要的能源进口国
美国是主要的能源出口国（得益于"页岩气革命"）
3.
天朝卖给美国的商品（比如：服装、日用品、电器、等），如果天朝停止供应，美国佬自己也能造出来。
美国卖给天朝的东西，有很多（比如：芯片、大豆、民航客机、等）是天朝自己搞不出来滴。尤其像大豆和芯片，还是咱们非买不可滴！
既然说到"大豆"，顺便展开一下（请允许俺稍微跑题）
很多国内的愤青对"大豆"存在【误解】。
误解1：
如果美国不卖给中国大豆，中国可以自己种
澄清：
大豆的种植很消耗耕地。以中国的大豆进口量（以每年9000万吨计算），如果全部改为自己种植，大约消耗【1/5至1/4】的国内耕地。那其它农作物咋办？
误解2：
如果美国不卖给中国大豆，中国还可以找巴西和阿根廷买
澄清：
虽然大豆出口国前三名是"美国、巴西、阿根廷"，但这三国的大豆生产又被【四大国际粮商】控制。
四大国际粮商分别是：美国ADM、美国邦吉、美国嘉吉、法国路易达孚（请注意：前三名都是美国佬）。
另外别忘了：拉美是美国的"后院"。如果美国佬下定决心不给你大豆，你以为咱天朝还能从巴西/阿根廷手中买到吗？
误解3：
没了大豆，咱们就不吃豆制品呗。
澄清：
进口的大豆可【不光是】用来搞豆制品滴。别的不说，光【豆粕】就是养猪业的主要【廉价】饲料来源。
没了廉价的豆粕，猪肉价格会明显上涨。而历朝历代以来，都把"肉价/米价"的稳定视作社会稳定的基础。
◇美国佬的优势——其本质在于【人才优势】
上述提到了4个维度，美国佬都能占据【绝对主导】的地位。很多人认为：美国佬是因为具备了军事优势，才能建立上述这4个优势。但这种观点依然停留在【表象】。更本质的原因在于——美国佬具有人才优势（"军事优势"也需要"人才优势"才能建立并维持）。
关于"人才"这个话题，约瑟夫·奈在这篇文章中提到了：
当被问及为何中国的综合实力不会很快超过美国时，已故新加坡总理李光耀指出，美国能够接纳全世界的人才，并充分激发他们的多样性和创造力，这在以汉族占统治地位的中国是不可想象的。
类似的观点，俺在两年前（2018）的博文《厉害国真的很厉害吗？——给小粉红们泼点冷水》也提到了。在那篇博文中，俺花了很长篇幅谈"人才的重要性"以及"中美之间的差异"。在谈"中美人才差距"时，俺总结了4点。李光耀提到的那句话，只是其中一点。
◇天朝的问题
天朝的问题有很多，有大有小，有难有易。俺个人认为：真正的难题是那些【严重依赖时间】的问题。啥意思捏？比如说"民主化转型、建立人才储备、改善人口结构、保障粮食安全"（或诸如此类的问题），这些都要花好几代人的时间才能慢慢搞定。
如果没有发生"中美新冷战"，天朝本来可以花时间逐步解决这些问题（俺称之为"腾挪的余地"）。但由于习呆呆太傻逼，在自身实力远远不如美国佬的情况下，就主动进行各种挑衅（比如：一带一路、南海造岛、香港送中条例......）。在习呆呆的不懈努力下，美国各界终于对【反中】达成高度共识。等到美国佬开始竭尽全力地围堵/遏制天朝，那么，"腾挪的余地"就被挤压掉了。
俺博客上，和本文相关的帖子（需翻墙）：
《从量变到质变——中美关系40年》
《聊聊"核战略的博弈模型"与"中美新冷战"》
《澄清"中美对抗"常见的一些【误解】》
《厉害国真的很厉害吗？——给小粉红们泼点冷水》
《苏联是如何被慢慢勒死的？——聊聊冷战中美国的遏制战略》
《每周转载："中美对抗"进入【科技脱钩】阶段（网文7篇）》
《每周转载：关于美国封杀华为（网文8篇）》
《每周转载：中美贸易战升级，双方关税加码（外媒报道和网友评论）》
《每周转载：盘点一下贸易战爆发后的【中美对抗】（2018年4季度）》
from 编程随想的博客 https://ift.tt/2EzmkhK
