译者 lindaones
A euro referendum
欧元公投
Greece’s woes
希腊的噩梦
The markets are not the euro’s only threat. Voters may be too
市场并非是对欧元命运的唯一威胁，公投也能使欧元覆灭。
Nov 5th 2011 | from the print edition
2011年11月5日，《经济学人》印刷版
EVEN by the euro zone’s undemanding standards, a summit deal that survived less than a week is lamentable. Early on October 27th Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, hailed a “comprehensive package” to save the euro. Yet by the time The Economist went to press, their plans were in tatters. Greece’s prime minister, George Papandreou, looked doomed, rejected by some of his ministers, many in his party—and, possibly, most of his country.
欧盟峰会提出的一揽子方案竟然不到一周就夭折了，即使以欧元区相对宽松的标准来看，这也无疑堪称悲剧。11月27日临晨，德国总理默克尔和法国总统萨科齐联手推出了拯救欧元的“一揽子计划”。可惜计划没有变化快，还没等本刊印刷出版，拯救计划就泡汤了。这一切的始作俑者正是希腊总理帕潘德里欧，也许是命中注定难逃此劫，目前他已经众叛亲离，反对他的声浪不仅来自一些内阁部长和大部分执政党成员，恐怕还包括希腊全国人民。
The shallowness of the summit’s achievements has been brutally exposed. Instead of settling into a period of calm, markets were thrown into new turmoil (see article). One way or another, the euro is destined for an unavoidable test of popular support. Unless the euro zone’s leaders shape up, this is an encounter their currency may well lose.
峰会的成果让人啼笑皆非，它不仅没有使欧洲局势趋于缓和，反而让市场再次陷入新的漩涡。从方方面面看来，欧元都将不可避免的接受大众支持度的考验。除非欧元区领导人能够绝地反击，否则欧元势必凶多吉少。
Heed the messenger
弦外之音
Mr Papandreou was in part the author of his own misfortune. Seeking the backing of the Greek people in a referendum, he was immediately condemned in the capitals of Europe as a fool or a traitor. Why had he wrecked all their good work? How dare he bring disaster on the rest of the euro zone when it had so generously bailed out his scapegrace of a country? A furious Mr Sarkozy and Mrs Merkel summoned him for a dressing-down on the fringes of the G20 summit in Cannes. Mr Sarkozy’s hopes that this gathering might set the stage for generous emerging-market investment to support the euro were already faint. They now look impossible.
其实，希腊总理帕潘德里欧是搬起石头砸了自己的脚。他希望通过对欧债救助计划进行公投，来寻求希腊人民的支持，结果却随即遭致欧洲各国的骂声连连，称其为傻瓜和叛徒。为什么他偏要使欧盟的努力付之东流。当整个欧洲都在为他捅的娄子而慷慨解囊时，他却胆敢恩将仇报。出离愤怒的萨科齐和默克尔在戛纳G20峰会的外围会议上对其一顿痛批。萨科齐原本还奢望借此峰会，向阔绰的新兴市场国家寻求欧债支援。现在看来，这已经完全不可能了。
There is no disputing that Mr Papandreou, in spectacularly chaotic style, has left the euro zone racked by uncertainty. His referendum now seems unlikely to take place. Perhaps Pasok, his party, will enter a government of national unity with New Democracy, the opposition, headed by a technocrat. Perhaps there will be an election. Perhaps even these plans will fall apart, just as the last did (see article). All the while, the clock is ticking: within a month or so, Greece must receive fresh funds from the IMF and its European rescuers—or messily default.
毫无疑问，帕先生以糟糕透顶的方式，使欧元区再次陷入前途未卜的痛苦之中。就目前形势来看，他的公投也难逃夭折命运。也许，他领导的执政党（泛希腊社会主义运动党）将与反对党（新民主党）组成联合政府，由更有才能的人领导。也许希腊将会进行选举。也许，就连这些计划也将半途而废，就如同上一个欧债救助计划一样。此时此刻，倒计时的秒表正在滴答作响：希腊只剩一个多月的时间了，必须从国际国币基金组织（IMF）和欧洲赈灾盟国那里获得资金支持，否则债务违约在劫难逃。
Mr Papandreou has created an almighty mess, but he is better cast as the messenger than the villain. He was not to blame for the summit’s shortcomings. The spreads between Italian and German government debt had begun to widen well before Mr Papandreou dropped his bombshell. If the euro zone had put a credible firewall around the government bonds of Italy and other troubled euro countries, a Greek default would not now be threatening contagion. Stable sovereign borrowers would have helped to safeguard Europe’s banks, and a decent plan to strengthen the weakest banks would have secured the door. But last week’s summit deal—concocting a jerry-built firewall and asking the banks to boost their capital ratios by June next year—was not up to scratch. No wonder the markets took fright only days later.
尽管帕先生制造的混乱非同小可，但他并非罪魁祸首，充其量只是个传声筒。他不该成为欧盟峰会败笔的替罪羊。早在在帕先生掷下公投这一重磅炸弹之前，意德两国的国债息差就已经开始扩大了。但凡欧元区可以围绕意大利及其他受困成员国的国债市场建立起可靠的防火墙，希腊债务违约都不可能像现在这样，成为欧元区的心腹大患。因为那样的话，欧洲银行业将获得主权借款人的稳定支持，而一份体面的银行业提振计划也将起到保障作用。可惜，上周欧盟峰会达成的协议仅是隔靴搔痒，建立一个豆腐渣样的防火墙，以及要求银行于明年6月前提高资本率，对于挽救危机根本无济于事。难怪还没过两天，市场就又重新陷入恐慌之中。
At one level, Mr Papandreou does not deserve blame even for seeking a mandate on the summit’s main achievement (though he must now be ruing his decision). Although the proposal to write down the face value of privately held Greek-government debt by 50% would be substantial and welcome, Greece’s stock of debt would, even on best assumptions, still add up to 120% of GDP by 2020. All the while, the Greek people would be living with austerity.
某种程度上讲，帕先生甚至不该受到指责，他不过是就欧盟峰会的重要成果征求一下民意罢了（尽管现在，他一定在为自己的决定捶胸顿足）。尽管减记希腊政府私人部门50%账面债务的提议非常实在，着实应该受到欢迎；但话说回来，即使在最乐观的情况下，希腊的剩余债务仍将是截至2020年全国累计GDP的120%。也就是说，希腊人民将持续生活在经济紧缩状态之中。
Hence Mr Papandreou’s most important message. Until now the euro crisis has chiefly been about pressure from the markets. But a country’s finances are not defined by markets alone. Rather the limits of solvency are tested by people’s willingness to accept tax rises and spending cuts. A government runs out of political capital long before it runs out of things to tax. In the end, won’t pay matters more than can’t pay.
所以说，帕先生只是传达了一个重要信息。截至目前，欧债危机所面临的主要压力仍来自于市场。但是，对于一个国家的金融而言，市场的影响只是一个方面。对于希腊偿还能力的极限，不如通过希腊人民的意愿来进行考量，看看老百姓是否愿意接受增加赋税和减少开支的政策来偿清债务。一个政府的政治资本可能会用完，但可以征税的项目却数不胜数。最终，问题的关键将是还债的意愿，而非还债的能力。
Greece is farther down this road than any other member of the euro zone—even though other countries such as Portugal and Ireland have already seen their governments toppled and Spain is about to follow suit. Beset by rebels in his own party, by a hostile media and by strikes and protests, Mr Papandreou concluded that he would find it hard to impose the austerity being asked of Greece. Every quarter the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB) scrutinise Greece before releasing the next chunk of money. With nowhere to hide, he decided to appeal over the heads of his opponents to the people.
尽管葡萄牙、爱尔兰等国政府已经因为债务危机而摇摇欲坠，而西班牙貌似很快也会步其后尘，但在这一问题上，希腊可谓是欧元区的老大难了。面对来自执政党内的抗议，媒体的恶意围攻，以及全国各地此起彼伏的示威游行，帕先生坦言无法将希腊人民推入负债累累的火坑之中。每个季度，欧盟、国际货币基金组织和欧洲央行都会在调拨大额资助前对希腊进行一番刁难。一不做二不休，这次帕先生索性挺胸抬头直面人民，不去理会那些反对的声音。
Greece’s next government, whatever its composition, cannot escape the growing resentment of the country’s political class. A growing but still small contingent of Greeks wants to defy the EU’s treaties and quit the euro altogether. Fully 60% reject the summit deal. But Greek withdrawal still looks like a terrible mistake. Depositors would rush to pull their money out of Greek banks to protect their savings from being converted into new drachma. Greek firms would be bankrupted by their euro debts. The gain in competitiveness from devaluation would be transient if, as is likely, wages inflated along with prices. Even Greece’s EU membership would be in doubt.
无论希腊的下一届政府由谁来领导，都无法回避人民对于党政阶层的憎恶。目前，尽管想挑战欧盟并退出欧元区的希腊人还为数不多，但该人数仍在持续增加。整整60%的希腊人反对欧盟峰会的决议。可是，退出欧元区对于希腊而言很可能是场灾难。这势必会导致银行挤兑，因为只有取出欧元存款，储户们才能保证他们的存款不会被兑换成新希腊元。而希腊企业则将因欧元负债而面临破产。此外，虽然本国货币贬值会给希腊带来短暂好处，但是由此引发的通货膨胀很可能令结果得不偿失。这样一来，连希腊的欧盟成员国资格都将打上问号。
What to do?
下一步工作安排
Greece’s government must wisely spend what scant political capital it may have. Above all, the economy needs to grow. Despite their anger, 70% of Greeks say they want to remain in the euro, but their tolerance for austerity has limits. The government must devote less effort to growth-destroying tax rises and instead undertake growth-promoting structural reforms. It will have to begin facing down public-sector unions and enforcing barely implemented reforms. Mr Papandreou’s government consistently took the easy way out.
希腊政府必须将其有限的政治资本用好用足。首先，经济发展是必须的。尽管希腊人民对政府怨声载道，但是70%的希腊人仍表示希望继续留在欧元区，但同时，他们对于经济紧缩的忍耐力也是有限的。政府必须保证经济增长，放宽税收政策，并将更多精力投入到刺激经济增长的体制改革中；而且，政府还需要顶住公共部门的压力，将尚未启动的各项改革落到实处。而帕先生领导的希腊政府的一贯做法却是避重就轻图省事儿。
The euro zone’s emphasis on austerity rather than structural reforms has aggravated Greece’s political woes. Instead it should favour medium-term fiscal consolidation. The creditor nations could boost domestic demand, to provide a bigger market for debtors’ exports. Most of all, they should dispel the threat of contagion by putting the ECB’s balance-sheet behind the debt of solvent governments, like Italy and Spain. Throughout this crisis, creditors—particularly Germany—have worried about being too soft on the euro zone’s weaklings, for fear that they would go slow on reform. Mr Papandreou has shown that they also need to worry about being too austere.
欧元区各国一再强调，希腊应该实施经济紧缩，而非经济体制改革，这无疑加剧了希腊国内的政治危机。其实，欧盟更应该帮助成员国们建立起一条中期财政的统一战线，债权国可以通过刺激内需，为债务国提供更广大的出口市场。而所有工作的重中之重，则是将欧洲央行变成意大利、西班牙等成员国的经济后盾，以此打消有偿还能力成员国担心惹祸上身的后顾之忧。纵观整场欧债危机，欧元区的债权国，也就是德国，一直担心欧盟对于一些弱国的姑息纵容，会拖累他们的改革进程。而帕先生的举动则提醒了欧盟，有时候过于严厉，也将适得其反。
from the print edition | Leaders
原文摘自《经济学人》印刷版 | 社论
from 译言-每日精品译文推荐 http://article.yeeyan.org/view/254696/229647
