Info Aggregator: 经济学人:拿什么拯救你，欧债危机？

Saturday 29 October 2011

经济学人:拿什么拯救你，欧债危机？

译者 lindaones

Economic crisis Europe’s rescue plan

经济危机：拯救欧洲行动

This week’s summit was supposed to put an end to the euro crisis. It hasn’t

人们期待本周的欧盟峰会能够给欧债危机画上句号，怎奈事与愿违。

Oct 29th 2011 | from the print edition

2011年10月29日，《经济学人》打印版

YOU can understand the self-congratulation. In the early hours of October 27th, after marathon talks, the leaders of the euro zone agreed on a “comprehensive package” to dispel the crisis that has been plaguing the euro zone for almost two years. They boosted a fund designed to shore up the euro zone’s troubled sovereign borrowers, drafted a plan to restore Europe’s banks, radically cut Greece’s burden of debt, and set out some ways to put the governance of the euro on a proper footing. After a summer overshadowed by the threat of financial collapse, they had shown the markets who was boss.

什么叫自己向自己道贺？10月27日凌晨，在一场马拉松式的谈判之后，欧元区的领导人们终于就欧债危机达成了一揽子协议，希望以此祛除笼罩欧元区长达两年之久的欧债阴霾。欧洲峰会决议通过，扩大金融稳定基金规模，以救助深陷债务危机的欧元区国家；制订欧洲银行复兴草案；从根本上减记希腊债务；并为欧元监管提供多种适宜的解决方案。整个夏天，欧洲金融市场都在崩盘的威胁中惶惶不可终日。而现在，他们终于向市场证明了，谁才是老大。

Yet in the light of day, the holes in the rescue plan are plain to see. The scheme is confused and unconvincing. Confused, because its financial engineering is too clever by half and vulnerable to unintended consequences. Unconvincing, because too many details are missing and the scheme at its core is not up to the job of safeguarding the euro.

然而天亮之后，欧洲拯救计划的诸多漏洞也现形于光天化日之下。真可谓一团混乱，难以服众。说它一团混乱，因为这项金融拯救计划太过处心积虑，而面对可能产生的种种不良结果，又显得不堪一击。说它难以服众，因为整个计划并未提及实施细节，且该计划的核心目的并不是为了保障欧元。

This is the euro zone’s third comprehensive package this year. It is unlikely to be its last.

这已经是欧盟在今年第三次推出解决欧债危机的一揽子计划了。看起来这绝不会是最后一次。

Words are cheap…

纸上谈兵…

The summit’s most notable achievement was to forge an agreement to write down the Greek debt held by the private sector by 50%. This newspaper has long argued for such a move. Yet an essential counterpart to the Greek writedown is a credible firewall around heavily indebted yet solvent borrowers such as Italy. That is the only way of restoring confidence and protecting European banks’ balance-sheets, thus ensuring that they can get on with the business of lending.

此次欧盟峰会的首要成果就是各方达成协议，减记希腊50%的私营部门债务。本刊早就赞成欧盟采取这一行动了。这边是希腊债务减记，那边是意大利等其他仍具备偿还能力的重债务国筑起的防火墙。只有这样，才能恢复市场信心，同时保证欧洲银行收支平衡，从而使银行得以恢复贷款业务。

Unfortunately the euro zone’s firewall is the weakest part of the deal (see article). Europe’s main rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), does not have enough money to withstand a run on Italy and Spain. Germany and the European Central Bank (ECB) have ruled out the only source of unlimited support: the central bank itself. The euro zone’s northern creditor governments have refused to put more of their own money into the pot.

只可惜，欧元区防火墙恰恰是整个计划中最薄弱的环节。作为主要的救助基金，欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）并没有足够的经济实力去解决意大利和西班牙的问题。德国和欧洲央行（ECB）均已表示欧洲央行的无限注资是不可能的。欧元区北部的债权国政府已无意向这滩泥潭中注入更多他们的资金。

Instead they have come up with two schemes to stretch the EFSF. One is to use it to insure the first losses if any new bonds are written down. In theory, this means that the rescue fund’s power could be magnified several times. But in practice, such “credit enhancement” may not yield much. Bond markets may be suspicious of guarantees made by countries that would themselves be vulnerable if their over-indebted neighbours suffered turmoil.

取而代之的，是他们提出的两种EFSF基金增容方案。第一种方案中，赈灾基金将主要用于国债担保，也就是说当新发行的国债遭遇减值时，用于弥补直接损失。从理论上讲，这意味着赈灾基金的实力被放大了若干倍。但是在实际操作中，这种“信用担保”不会起很大作用。国债市场对于某些国家的担保不会太买账，因为当他们的邻国深陷债务危机时，这些担保国也将自身难保。

Under the second scheme, the EFSF would create a set of special-purpose vehicles financed by other investors, including sovereign-wealth funds. Again, there are reasons to doubt whether this will work. Each vehicle seems to be dedicated to a single country, so risk is not spread. And why should China or Brazil invest a lot in them when Germany is holding back from putting in more money?

在第二种方案中，EFSF基金将设立一组“专项救助基金”，这部分基金由其他投资人，包括主权财富基金进行注资。同样，这种方案也遭到质疑。专项救助基金貌似只针对某一个国家进行金融救助，因此风险不会蔓延。可是，为什么中国或巴西就该拿出钱来拯救欧洲，而德国却可以拒绝再为欧债危机多掏一分钱？

Together, these schemes are supposed to extend the value of the EFSF to €1 trillion ($1.4 trillion) or more. Sadly, that looks more like an aspiration than a prediction. And because the EFSF bears the first losses, its capital is at greater risk of being wiped out than under a loan programme. This could taint France, which finances the rescue fund and has recently seen its AAA credit rating come under threat. Since the EFSF depends partly on France for its own credit rating, a French downgrade could undermine the rescue fund just when it is most needed.

两种方案加起来，EFSF基金的规模将增加至1万亿欧元（约1.4万亿美元）。可惜，这个数字看起来不像是个预测值，反而像是一种奢望。因为EFSF基金将直接承担希腊债务减记的损失，它的资金风险要比普通贷款的大许多倍。这可能导致法国名誉扫地，因为法国已向赈灾基金注入资金，其AAA的信用评级目前正面临着降级威胁。由于EFSF基金也部分依赖于法国的评级，因此一旦法国遭遇降级，那么无疑将在欧洲急需赈灾基金的关头，给欧债危机带来沉重打击。

If the foundations of the firewall are too shallow, then the bank plan plunges too deep. By the end of June 2012, banks are expected to establish a core-capital ratio of 9%. In principle, that is laudable. But if banks have months to reach their target, they can avoid raising new equity, which would dilute their shareholders’ stakes, and instead move to the required ratio by shrinking their balance-sheets. That would be a terrible outcome: by depriving Europe’s economy of credit, it would worsen the downturn.

如果说，欧洲的防火墙根基太浅，那么银行业的扶持计划可谓涉足太深。峰会决定，截至2012年6月底，银行的核心资本率预计将达到9%。原则上讲，这项决议是值得拍手叫好的。但是问题是，现在距离明年6月还有好几个月，银行完全可以在此之前避免投资新资产，以免摊薄银行股东的股份，相反采取缩减银行资产负债的方式达到要求的核心资本率。这么做将会导致可怕的后果：整个欧洲经济的信用将不复存在，欧洲经济衰退将进一步加深。

Then there is Greece. Although the size of the writedown is welcome, euro-zone leaders are desperate for it to be “voluntary”. That is because a default would trigger the bond-insurance contracts called credit-default swaps (CDSs). The fear is that a default could lead to chaos, because the CDS market is untested. That is true, but this implausibly large “voluntary” writedown will lead investors in other European sovereign bonds to doubt whether CDSs offer much protection. So while the EFSF scheme is designed to offer insurance to bondholders, the European leaders’ insistence that the Greek writedown be voluntary will make euro-zone debt harder to insure.

再说说希腊。尽管欧元区领导人们对希腊债务减记的幅度表示满意，可他们还希望这是“无偿的”。因为债务违约将引发债券保险收缩，也就是信用违约掉期(CDSs)。市场担心，一次违约就可能导致金融市场的混乱，因为信用掉期违约（CDS）市场可不是闹着玩的。事实的确如此，但是面对如此巨大的“无偿”债务减记，投资其他欧洲国债的投资人势必产生疑问，怀疑信用违约掉期是否还有保值作用？因此，尽管EFSF基金计划给国债投资人提供担保，欧洲领导人执意无偿减记希腊债务的行为，无疑将加大欧元区的债务担保难度。

…but trust is nowhere to be found

…信任危机

Europe has got to this point because German politicians are convinced that without market pressure the euro zone’s troubled economies will slacken their efforts at reform (see article). Despite a list of promises presented to the summit by Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister (see article), Germany has good reason to worry. But it needs to concentrate on institutional ways of disciplining profligate governments, rather than starving the rescue package of funds. As it is, this deal at best fails to solve the euro crisis; at worst it may even make it worse. As the shortcomings of each component become clear, investors’ fears will surely return, bond yields will rise and banks’ funding problems will worsen.

德国政客一再强调在没有市场压力的情形下，欧元区的受困成员国将削弱德国的经济改革力度；于是，欧洲开始意识到出现了信任危机。尽管在欧盟峰会召开前夕，意大利总理Silvio Berlusconi向峰会做出了一系列承诺，德国的担心绝非杞人忧天。然而，德国需要将注意力放在对问题政府约定俗成的处罚上，而不是眼看赈灾基金捉襟见肘而一毛不拔。事实上，做了这笔交易，最好的情形无非就是对欧元危机于事无补，而最差，则是使情形变的更糟。随着各方弱点的逐步显现，投资人们会重新变得忧心忡忡，国债收益将继续增加，而银行融资困境将持续恶化。

Yet again, disaster will loom. And yet again, the ECB will end up staving it off. Fortunately, Mario Draghi, the ECB’s incoming president, made it clear this week that he realises that is his job. But therein lies the tragedy of this summit. An ECB pledge of unlimited backing for solvent governments would have had a far better chance of solving the crisis months ago, and remains the best option today.

危机必定会再一次来临，而欧洲央行必定也会再一次设法拖延。幸运的是，新上任的欧洲央行行长Mario Draghi在本周明确表示，他明白解决危机就是他的工作。怎奈本周的欧盟峰会最终还是上演了悲剧。假如欧洲央行能早点承诺为有偿还能力的成员国政府提供无限额支持，那么欧债危机很可能在几个月前就已经解决了，而时至今日，这也仍是解决危机的最佳选择。

At this summit Europe’s leaders had hoped to prove that their resolve to back the euro was greater than the markets’ capacity to bet against it. For all the backslapping and brave words, they have once again failed. There will be more crises, and further summits. By the time they settle on a solution that works, the costs will have risen still further.

欧洲领导人们一度希望借此峰会，证明他们捍卫欧元的决心比市场预期的还要大。尽管说了不少自吹自擂的豪言壮语，他们还是失败了。今后还会出现更多的危机和更多的峰会。等到了他们最终找到行之有效的解决方法那一天，付出的代价将会更大。

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