暫時沒有時間總結我的分析，外判給Krguman與Robini。
Consider the following picture: Recent growth has relied on a huge construction boom fueled by surging real estate prices, and exhibiting all the classic signs of a bubble. There was rapid growth in credit — with much of that growth taking place not through traditional banking but rather through unregulated “shadow banking” neither subject to government supervision nor backed by government guarantees. Now the bubble is bursting — and there are real reasons to fear financial and economic crisis.
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And there was another parallel with U.S. experience: as credit boomed, much of it came not from banks but from an unsupervised, unprotected shadow banking system. There were huge differences in detail: shadow banking American style tended to involve prestigious Wall Street firms and complex financial instruments, while the Chinese version tends to run through underground banks and even pawnshops.
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I remember very well getting similar assurances about Japan in the 1980s, where the brilliant bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance supposedly had everything under control. And later, there were assurances that America would never, ever, repeat the mistakes that led to Japan’s lost decade — when we are, in reality, doing even worse than Japan did.
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For what it’s worth, statements about economic policy from Chinese officials don’t strike me as being especially clear-headed. In particular, the way China has been lashing out at foreigners — among other things, imposing a punitive tariff on imports of U.S.-made autos that will do nothing to help its economy but will help poison trade relations — does not sound like a mature government that knows what it’s doing…
…anecdotal evidence suggests that while China’s government may not be constrained by rule of law, it is constrained by pervasive corruption…
Meanwhile, flaws in China’s growth model are becoming obvious. Falling property prices are starting a chain reaction that will have a negative effect on developers, investment, and government revenue. The construction boom is starting to stall, just as net exports have become a drag on growth, owing to weakening US and especially eurozone demand. Having sought to cool the property market by reining in runaway prices, Chinese leaders will be hard put to restart growth.
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…with so many persistent tail risks and global uncertainties weighing on final demand, and with excess capacity remaining high, owing to past over-investment in real estate in many countries and China’s surge in manufacturing investment in recent years, these companies’ capital spending and hiring have remained muted.
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To paraphrase Bette Davis in All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy year!”
三大因素決定中國明年必然出現重大經濟問題：低收入、外貿額下降、高通脹（雖然在政府打壓之下，樓價呈下降趨勢，但因爲中國增長依賴建設與外貿，低通脹會引來大規模失業，見這裡）。我估計下半年會開始明朗化。核心問題是人民收入/本地需求太低，所以經濟容易受外部因素所影響。多年以壓低工資提升競爭力的方法現在得到反效果。同時，在缺乏法治與保障社會正義的制度下，「先富起來」的一批人變成既得利益者（地產發展商、外貿商、國有企業、國有銀行與證券公司），與貪腐的政府連結起來成爲反對改革的急先鋒。
http://wp.me/pXZbk-F8
Filed under: 政治與經濟 Tagged: 經濟危機, 中國政治經濟
from 山中雜記 http://montwithin.wordpress.com/2011/12/21/%e4%b8%ad%e5%9c%8b%e4%be%86%e5%b9%b4%e7%b6%93%e6%bf%9f%e5%b1%95%e6%9c%9b/
