译者 soonekid
The standoff in Wukan exemplifies the growing tensions between state and society in a rapidly urbanising country
乌坎的对峙反映了在一个快速城市化的国家，政府和社会之间日益紧张的关系。
Relatives of Xue Jinbo, a 42-year-old village leader who died in police custody in Wukan, mourn at his funeral. Photograph: Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images
薛锦波的家人在他的葬礼上悲痛欲绝。42岁的薛锦波是乌坎村的带头人，死于被警方羁押期间。
After continuous confrontation between villagers and local officials for almost four months, the land grab in the fishing village of Wukan, in Guandong province, China, has now led to the death of one of the elected village leaders in police custody, and further escalated into a violent "mass incident" with tens of thousands of farmers protesting against local officials.
在村民与当地官员持续冲突了近4个月后，这场发生在广东一个渔村——乌坎村——里的土地强占事件已经导致了一名由村民推选出来的代表在被警方羁押期间死亡，并进一步升级为激烈的“群体性事件”，事件中有上万名农民向当地官员抗议。
The Wukan case is just one of many mass incidents China has experienced in recent years. In fact, the number keeps rising every year; journalists often cite a figure of 87,000 for 2005, estimates by the China Academy of Social Sciences give a figure of "over 90,000" mass incidents in 2006, and further unspecified increases in 2007 and 2008.
乌坎村事件只是中国近年来发生的诸多群体性事件当中的一例。事实上，这个数字每年都在不断上升；记者们经常引用的数字是2005年发生了87000例，中国社科院估计2006年群体性事件的数量“超过90000例”，而2007和2008年的数字还要更高。
In China, a mass incident is defined as "any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of internal contradictions", including mass public speeches, physical conflicts, airing of grievances, or other forms of group behaviour that may disrupt social stability. Among China's mass incidents, more than 60% have been related to land disputes when local governments in China worked closely with manufacturers and real-estate developers to grab land from farmers at low prices.
在中国，群体性事件的定义是“任何由内部矛盾引发的有计划或临时形成的集会”，包括公开演讲、肢体冲突、当众表达不满，或其它可能破坏社会稳定的各种形式的群体行为。由于地方政府与企业和房地产开发商“密切配合”、以低价从农民手中攫取土地，中国的群体性事件中超过60%都与土地纠纷有关。
In a drive to industrialise and urbanise, thousands of industrial parks and many thousands of real estate development projects have been, or are being, built at the costs of dispossessed farmers. The land requisition system deprives three to four million farmers of their land every year, and around 40-50 million are now dispossessed.
在工业化和城市化大潮中，无数的工业园区和房地产开发项目已经并正在以农民失去土地为代价建设起来。土地征用制度每年夺走3、4百万农民的土地，大约有4、5千万农民已经丧失了土地。
The Wukan case says a lot about the serious tension between state and society in the fast urbanising China. It is difficult to play the land requisition game fairly under the current system, since farmers are neither allowed to negotiate directly on the compensation package, nor are they allowed to develop their own land for non-agricultural purposes. They have to sell their land to local government first, which defines the price then leases the land to industrial and commercial/residential users for a profit. As land prices keep rising in China, it is not surprising that farmers with rising expectations are becoming increasingly unhappy. As a result, mass incidents, sometimes as violent as in Wukan, are inevitable.
乌坎事件充分体现了在快速城市化的中国，政府和社会之间的关系已变得非常紧张。在现有体制下，由于既不允许农民就补偿条件直接谈判，又不许他们把自己的土地用于非农业用途，因此很难让土地征用做到公平。农民必须先把土地按照当地政府制定的价格卖给它们，政府再将土地出租给工商业或居民用户，从中获利。随着中国土地价格不断上涨，很自然地，抱有更高期待的农民会越来越不满。其结果就是，群体性事件无可避免，其中一些爆发得就像乌坎事件一样激烈。
Local authorities in China, in their pursuit of revenue via aggressive urbanisation and industrialisation, are also undermining the country's grassroots democracy. It was usually local officials who would carry out difficult negotiations with village collectives, or who were in charge of coercing defiant farmers to accept government terms. Having village cadres who shared their interests would not only lower the selling price but also determine whether or not the transaction could take place at all. Therefore, township and county officials in localities that experienced greater land requisition had a stronger incentive to manipulate village democracies to make sure that more co-operative cadres were elected.
在通过快速扩张的城市化和工业化进程追逐收入的同时，地方政府也损害了中国的基层民主。与村集体进行艰难的谈判、或者负责强迫不服从的农民接受政府的条件的，通常都是当地的官员。如果村干部和他们利益一致，不仅可以压低土地出售价格，还能决定交易到底是否能够达成。因此，一个地方的征地规模越大，当地的乡镇和县级官员操纵村级民主的欲望就越强烈，以确保让更听话的干部当选。
One township party secretary I interviewed in Fujian province said: "If election rules are followed strictly, [we] will lose control of the rural society. Village cadres will be afraid of villagers, not the township government. They can put off assignments from the township government and compromise the tasks during implementation. Therefore … local officials are willing to introduce rules that subvert the true meaning of village democracy. This is also the case in Wukan in which farmers are protesting not only against local governments, but also against villager cadres who worked with the authorities in abusive land requisition.
我在福建采访过的一位乡党委书记说：“如果严格遵守选举规则，（我们）将失去对农村社会的控制。村干部将会害怕村民，不怕乡政府。他们会拖延乡政府布置的任务，在执行过程中也会打折扣。”因此...地方官员乐于制定一些规则，破坏村级民主的真正意义。乌坎村发生的就是这种情况，农民抗议的不仅是当地政府，还有那些和政府合作肆意征地的村干部。
As China is urbanising fast, land requisition takes place in more Chinese villages, in particular those closest to the cities. Farmers with rising expectations on the one hand, and local officials with financial stakes in keeping the compensation low on the other, are bound to lead to increasingly violent mass incidents. Local governments in China needs to spend more not only on compensating farmers, but also on maintaining social stability. Wukan should be a signal for China to reform its land requisition system in order to keep local governments away from the financial gains of abusive land taking.
由于中国正在快速城市化，更多的村庄出现了征地现象，特别是那些离城市最近的村子。一边是怀着更高期望的农民，另一边是需要压低补偿以从中获益的地方官员，这种状况势必导致越来越激烈的群体性事件的爆发。中国的地方政府不仅应该提高给农民的补偿，还应该多花力量维持社会稳定。乌坎事件应当作为一个信号，促使中国改革土地征用制度，使地方政府再不能从野蛮的征地之中获得经济利益。
from 译言-每日精品译文推荐 http://article.yeeyan.org/view/266133/240980
