2020年3月22日星期日
【明報專訊】要為恐怖主義下定義，似乎在1990年要比現在容易。那時候，我是負責反恐情報工作的政治部警官，恐怖主義是一種可以清楚識別的威脅，而恐怖分子則是可以清楚識別的人和組織。
1990至91年第一次波斯灣戰爭，伊拉克被美國和聯軍打敗，我們政治部因為恐襲威脅而進入高度警惕。不過，雖然英國有份參戰對付伊拉克，而支援阿拉伯恐怖主義的複雜網絡遠從中東伸到香港，甚至在香港有生意聯繫，但香港沒有發生任何襲擊。
第一次波斯灣戰爭 港英政治部高度警惕
當時的恐怖主義威脅大多與中東有關連，威脅主要來自（得到伊朗財政支持的）真主黨和多個巴勒斯坦恐怖組織，例如巴勒斯坦解放組織PLO（已揚棄恐怖主義但旗下尚有許多錯綜複雜的分支組織）、阿布尼達爾組織ANO（由崇尚暴力的班納Sabri al-Banna領導）、巴勒斯坦解放陣線PLF（由1985年挾持阿基萊勞倫號郵輪的賈布里納Ahmed Jibril領導）以及解放巴勒斯坦人民陣線PFLP（其魅力型領袖哈巴什George Habash曾策劃道森機場劫機事件，共騎劫5架西方客機，事件開啟了恐怖分子劫機的先河）。
1993年紐約世界貿易中心第一次遇襲，襲擊的其中一名領導者優素福（Ramzi Yousef）受其舅舅哈立德（Khalid Sheikh Mohammed）指導，後者正是2001年9月11日策劃飛機襲擊同一幢大樓的主謀。他們也曾在1994年策劃「波金卡行動」，如果並非事敗，就會在一天之內炸毁12架由亞洲各地起飛的商業客機。二人都擁有遍及亞洲多個城市的聯繫網絡，可見香港並非免疫於恐怖主義的威脅。哈立德在1990年代中成為蓋達組織的成員。
在1990年代初，我們政治部還不知道有蓋達這個組織。拉登是在1990年伊拉克入侵科威特、沙特邀請美軍進駐以防範伊拉克之後，才讓蓋達壯大成為一支長久的聖戰力量的。拉登曾向沙特王室自薦，提供一支阿拉伯聖戰軍作為對抗伊拉克的主力部隊，但建議被拒。如果薩達姆沒有入侵科威特，拉登就不會有機會發起聖戰。伊拉克敗走後，美軍沒有隨即撤出沙特，拉登由此與沙特王室反目，蓋達也得到阿拉伯世界更多的支持。與沙特王朝和美國對立的姿態，為他造就了「拉登與蓋達的神話」。
至1991年，蘇丹政府欲借助蓋達之技術訓練士兵，以派遣至該國的內戰中，拉登應邀將蓋達搬到蘇丹。盤踞蘇丹的這幾年，令蓋達有時間和基地針對更廣泛的目標統籌恐襲。1992年，也門亞丁兩間駐索馬里美軍下榻的酒店被炸，發動襲擊的「伊斯蘭舒拉軍」就有部分成員曾在索馬里的蓋達營地受訓。1995年11月，沙特國民衛隊位於利雅德的基地遇襲，被認為是拉登支持者所為。1996年6月沙特宰赫蘭市的美軍宿舍胡拜爾大樓遭到卡車炸彈襲擊，事件同樣涉及蓋達。
蓋達的訓練人員進入索馬里，協助當地軍閥與美軍戰鬥。拉登甚至聲稱，1993年美軍直升機在索馬里摩加迪沙被擊落，也是蓋達戰士所為。不過，最有可能是拉登試圖把自己的聖戰運動與摩加迪沙之戰拉關係，那場戰役最終導致美軍從索馬里撤兵，相關文宣自是有助加添蓋達的神話。
拉登向美宣戰聲明 蓋達出色的文宣
1996年至2001年間，蓋達在阿富汗設有基地，在那兒組織、整合力量，並謀劃對「遠敵」美國發動襲擊的策略。蓋達並跟其他聖戰組戰聯盟，以做好準備與美國展開更廣泛的衝突。1998年2月，拉登發出「向美國人宣戰」的聲明，聲明同時得到「對抗猶太人與十字軍的世界伊斯蘭聖戰陣線」（埃及伊斯蘭聖戰的傘形組織）、埃及伊斯蘭祈禱團以及一些克什米爾和巴基斯坦組織簽署。
這篇1998年聲明是一份出色的文宣，吸引、影響和鼓動回教徒投入蓋達所發起的、廣泛聯手對付美國的共同事業。蓋達變得愈來愈善於利用文宣製造氛圍，吸引不同組織和個人為了蓋達而發動襲擊。美國軍事力量遠為強大，但蓋達在這不對稱衝突中，藉着文宣創造了令己方力量倍增的方法。
此法得出的恐怖成果，在以下襲擊可見一斑：1998年8月美國駐肯尼亞和坦桑尼亞大使館同遭炸彈襲擊；2000年10月美艦科爾號在也門亞丁港被炸；2001年9月美國紐約市、華盛頓市、賓夕法尼亞州同時遭遇劫機兼自殺式襲擊。這些事件都成為蓋達上佳的宣傳材料，向全球的失意回教徒證明他們有能力成功襲擊美利堅這個超級大國。之後蓋達核心成員或其附屬組織持續發動襲擊，2002年遍及突尼斯、巴基斯坦、也門、印尼峇里、肯尼亞；2003年沙特、摩洛哥、印尼、土耳其；2004年菲律賓、西班牙、沙特；2005年倫敦、埃及、約旦；2007阿爾及利亞；2008巴基斯坦。911襲擊之後，蓋達不再單單是一個恐怖組織，它成為一個全球性的恐怖主義特許聯營集團，有分公司、子公司、附屬公司。
儘管蓋達取得巨大成功，試圖打倒美國的做法還是令它難逃一劫。恐怖分子挑戰一個已確立的國家是甚少能成功的，那國家總會動員種種資源對付共同的敵人，他們的暴力行動最終難免失敗。蓋達毫無疑問是恐怖組織，其1998年的「向美國人宣戰聲明」就是證據，然而，恐怖主義和恐怖分子往往是難以界定的。
恐怖主義是政治暴力之下的一個子集
舉一個例子，2012年9月美國駐利比亞班加西領事館遇襲，其後國務卿希拉里說：「這是源於一場示威，還是源於一班某夜出門的人決定要殺死一些美國人？這一刻，這問題帶來什麼差別？」對於來自共和黨的抨擊者而言，其差別在於總統奧巴馬如何看待這個襲擊，究竟視之為一場失控暴走的政治示威，還是一次有計劃的恐怖襲擊。由此，亦帶出客觀區分恐怖主義與其他形式政治暴力的重要性。
國家或種族之間的戰爭、國家內部不同群眾之間的內戰、革命、起義、暴力政治示威、暴亂、恐怖主義，這些全都是不同形式的「政治暴力」。恐怖主義是政治暴力之下的一個子集，暴力可以不涉恐怖主義，但恐怖主義不會沒有暴力。
根據香港法例，「恐怖主義行為」的定義如下——
（i）該行動是懷有達致以下結果的意圖而進行的，或該恐嚇是懷有作出會具有達致以下結果的效果的行動的意圖而進行的：（A）導致針對人的嚴重暴力；（B）導致對財產的嚴重損害；（C）危害作出該行動的人以外的人的生命；（D）對公眾人士或部分公眾人士的健康或安全造成嚴重危險；（E）嚴重干擾或嚴重擾亂電子系統的；或（F）嚴重干擾或嚴重擾亂基要服務、設施或系統（不論是公共或私人的）的；
以及（ii）該行動的作出或該恐嚇：（A）的意圖是強迫特區政府或國際組織的，或是威嚇公眾人士或部分公眾人士的；及（B）是為推展政治、宗教或思想上的主張而進行的。
跟這個冗長的法律定義成一對比的，是由聖安德魯斯大學已故教授威爾金森Paul Wilkinson提出的較簡單定義：「恐怖主義是有系統地使用脅迫威嚇的手段，通常是為了政治目的。」恐怖主義專家施密德Alex Schmid則在其1984年著作中，羅列了109種恐怖主義的不同定義。這對香港意味了什麼？那些與爭民主反政府示威相關的暴力行為當中，有沒有類近恐怖主義的行徑？
上列的法律定義並不足以帶出情感層面上的「恐怖主義」這個字眼，因為法律定義包含的一些政治暴力，並不符合以客觀理解「恐怖主義」的標準。2019年香港所見的示威暴力的確導致了對財產的損害、危害了生命、對公眾安全構成了危險，其意在威嚇和強迫香港政府回應五大訴求，這些訴求是政治的。然而，2019年的法國「黃背心」示威、伊拉克「十月革命」示威、因公眾不滿社會不公而爆發的智利暴力示威，同樣都落入上述的法律定義，但並無有力證據顯示，這些事件中的政治暴力應被稱為「恐怖主義」。
由此帶出了一個問題——為什麼香港警察聲稱香港的政治暴力可以歸入為「恐怖主義」。2020年3月，警方突擊搜查多個地點，檢出3個各含1.5公斤炸藥的炸彈、3個遙控裝置、2.6噸化學物品、6樽通渠液及60支電子火柴。警方表示，事件與1月和2月長沙灣明愛醫院發生爆炸、深圳灣口岸和港鐵羅湖站發現爆炸裝置（其中一個着火冒煙）有關。過去半年，警方還搜出了許多其他用作暴力和傷害他人的武器。不過，這些圖謀都沒有成功，所涉及的是門外漢水平的計劃部署。
港警將所有政治暴力等同恐怖主義
而警察和政府將所有政治暴力都等同為恐怖主義，這態度可見於2020年3月2日發出的新聞公報〈香港整體治安情况〉：「示威者的暴力行為由擲水樽、雜物，變為磚頭、鐵馬，再變為擲汽油彈、腐蝕性液體，甚至放箭。社會部分人不予以譴責，暴力更提升至用真槍實彈及爆炸品。暴徒為表達對社會及政府不滿，而選擇傷害市民大眾及引起社會恐慌，這正正是本土恐怖主義的行為。」
表達不滿、使用暴力和引起社會恐慌，並不是恐怖主義的法律定義，也不接近任何其他關於恐怖主義的眾多定義。這反映了界定恐怖主義是何等困難，以及為什麼不能任由某一署局例如警方但憑自己主張作出定義。界定恐怖主義是主觀的，而警方是示威暴力的對象，多次因而發生警員失去自控的情况，警方在引用這個字眼的時候，是會有情感偏見的。在任何情况下，要為恐怖主義下定義，都必須先經過政治領袖、政府行政部門、立法機關、司法部門和警方的審視，再由法庭作最終定斷。
香港的政治暴力當中，並不存在由恐怖主義運動驅使的組織、陰謀小組架構或團伙。幾個失落而被錯誤引導的香港年輕人悲情笨拙地試圖自製炸彈，這跟我們所知真正的恐怖分子——蓋達、真主黨、ISIS，並無任何相似的地方。這不是香港的恐怖主義。
What is Terrorism?
It seemed easier to define terrorism in 1990 when I was an Inspector in Special Branch working in counter terrorism intelligence. Terrorism was a clearly identifiable threat and the terrorists were clearly identifiable people and groups.
During 1990/91 "Gulf War One", when Iraq was defeated by US and coalition forces, in Special Branch we were on high alert because of the threat of terrorism but no attacks occurred in Hong Kong despite the British involvement in the war against Iraq and the complex network of Arab terrorist support stretching from the Middle East even to business contacts in Hong Kong.
Terrorist threats were largely related to the Middle East, mainly from Hezbollah (sponsored by Iran), as well as the multitude of Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (which had by then renounced terrorism but had a complicated membership of many sub-groups), Abu Nidal Organisation (led by the violent Sabri Al-Banna), the Palestine Liberation Front (led by Ahmed Jibril, responsible for the hijack of the Achile Lauro cruise ship in 1985), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by the charismatic George Habash who masterminded the Dawson's Fields hijacking of five Western airliners which inspired terrorist hijacking of planes).
Ramzi Yousef, one of the leaders of the first attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993, was guided by his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was the mastermind of the 9/11 airline attacks on the same building in 2001. They also plotted to organize "Operation Bojinka" in 1994 which if it had been successful would have destroyed twelve commercial planes originating from Asia on the same day. Both men established a network of contacts across cities in Asia, which showed that Hong Kong was not immune to the terrorist threat. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed later became a member of Al Qaeda in the mid-1990s.
In the early 1990s Al-Qaeda was not yet known to us in Special Branch. Osama Bin Laden's growth of Al Qaeda as a permanent jihadist force came after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invited US military forces to the country for defence. Bin Laden offered the Saudi royal family a force of Arab mujahedeen veterans as the core of a force against Iraq, but the offer was rejected. If Saddam Hussein had not invaded Kuwait, Bin Laden may not have been presented with an opportunity to wage jihadist war. The failure to withdraw US troops from Saudi Arabia immediately after the defeat of Iraq led to Bin Laden turning against the Saudi royal family and added to Arab support for Al Qaeda. The "myth of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda" was enhanced as he stood up to the House of Saud as well as the USA.
By 1991, Bin Laden had moved Al Qaeda to Sudan at the invitation of the government, which wanted their skills to train soldiers to fight in the country's civil war. The years in Sudan provided Al Qaeda with the time and a base to coordinate terrorist attacks against wider targets. In 1992 two hotels in Aden, Yemen, where US soldiers transited to Somalia, were bombed by the "Islamic Army Shura", some of whose members had trained at an Al Qaeda camp in Somalia. In November 1995 an attack on a National Guard base in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was attributed to supporters of Bin Laden. In June 1996 a truck bomb attack at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, involved Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda trainers entered Somalia to assist warlords fighting US forces. Bin Laden even claimed that in 1993 Al Qaeda fighters were responsible for the attacks on US military helicopters in Mogadishu, Somalia, but this was most likely an attempt to add to the myth of Al Qaeda by associating the movement with the battle that led to the exit of US forces from Somalia.
From 1996 to 2001, Al Qaeda had a base in Afghanistan to organize, consolidate, and plan strategy for attacks on the "far enemy" USA. Al Qaeda was able to develop alliances with other jihadist groups in preparation for more widespread conflict with the USA. In February 1998, Bin Laden issued the "declaration of war against Americans". The declaration was signed by the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders", which was an umbrella group for Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Jama at Islamiyah, and others from Kashmir and Pakistan.
The 1998 statement was a brilliant piece of propaganda to attract, influence, and motivate Muslims to a common cause with Al Qaeda in a wide alliance against the USA. Al Qaeda became increasingly adept at the use of propaganda to create a climate in which groups and individuals would carry out attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda, creating a force multiplier in the asymmetric conflict with the more militarily powerful USA.
The resulting terror was illustrated in the bomb attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, in October 2000, and the aircraft hijackings and suicide attacks in September 2001 in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania. These attacks were great propaganda for Al Qaeda, which had shown frustrated Muslims around the world that the superpower USA could be successfully attacked. Attacks either by Al Qaeda core members or affiliated groups continued from 2002 in Tunisia, Pakistan, Yemen, Bali, and Kenya; in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia, and Turkey; in 2004 in the Philippines, Spain, and Saudi Arabia; in 2005 in London, Egypt, and Jordan; in 2007 in Algeria; and in 2008 in Pakistan. After the 9/11 attacks Al Qaeda was not only a terrorist organisation, it became a global terrorist franchise with branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates.
Although Al Qaeda had great success it was doomed by trying to fight against the USA. Terrorists who challenge an established state rarely succeed and their violent action inevitably leads to defeat as the resources of the state are mobilized against a common enemy. Al Qaeda was without doubt a terrorist organisation, evidenced by the 1998 "declaration of war against Americans", but often terrorism and terrorists are difficult to define.
For instance, following the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said "Was it because of a protest, or was it because of guys out for a walk one night who decided they'd go kill some Americans? What difference, at this point, does it make?" It made a difference to Republican critics of how the administration of President Obama perceived the attack, either as an out of control violent political protest or a premeditated terrorist act, and hence the importance of objective distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence.
War between states or tribes, civil war between populations of a country, revolution, insurgency, violent political protests, riots, and terrorism are all forms of "political violence". Terrorism is subset of political violence, and violence may occur without terror but not terror without violence.
A "Terrorist act" has been defined in law in Hong Kong as: The action is carried out with the intention of, or the threat is made with the intention of using action that would have the effect of (A) causing serious violence against a person; (B) causing serious damage to property; (C) endangering a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action; (D) creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; (E) seriously interfering with or seriously disrupting an electronic system; or (F) seriously interfering with or seriously disrupting an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private; and (ii) the use or threat is (A) intended to compel the Government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and (B) made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
The lengthy legal definition contrasts with the simpler definition of the late Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University of St. Andrews, which is "Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends." Terrorism expert Alex Schmid has collated 109 different definitions of terrorism in his 1984 book on the subject. What does this mean in Hong Kong and do any of the violent acts associated with pro-democracy and anti-government protests resemble terrorism?
The legal definition is not sufficient to invoke the emotional term "terrorism" as it can include political violence that does not meet the standards of objective understandings of terrorism. The protester violence that occurred in 2019 caused damage to property, endangered lives, created a risk to the safety of the public, interfered with electronic systems (for instance traffic lights), and was intended to intimidate and compel the Hong Kong Government in relation to five demands that were political. But so did the 2019 "Yellow Vest" protests in France, the "October Revolution" protests in Iraq, and the violent protests in Chile that originated from public dissatisfaction regarding inequality. There is no compelling reason that the political violence in these events should be termed as "terrorism".
This raises the question of why the Police in Hong Kong have claimed that the political violence in Hong Kong could be categorized as "terrorism". In March 2020, the Police raided multiple locations and seized three bombs, each containing 1.5kg of explosives, with three remote-controlled devices, as well as 2.6 tons of chemicals with six bottles of drain cleaner and 60 electric matches. The Police stated that they were linked to bomb plots in January and February, involving an explosion at Caritas Medical Centre in Cheung Sha Wan, and devices found at Shenzhen Bay border crossing and Lo Wu railway station (one of which caught fire and spurted white smoke). Many other weapons intended for violence and to cause harm have also been seized by the Police in the past six months. These plots were not however at all successful and involved amateurish planning.
The Police and the Government are equating all political violence with terrorism, reflected in a press release on the law and order situation on 2 March 2020 which said "Violent acts committed by the protestors changed from throwing water bottles and other objects to hurling bricks and mills barriers or even petrol bombs, corrosive liquids and shooting arrows. Some members of the public refused to condemn such behaviours and as a result violence escalated to genuine firearms, bullets and explosives. In order to express their dissatisfaction with the society and the government, rioters chose to hurt the public and cause social panic which exactly is the behaviour of home-grown terrorism."
Expressing dissatisfaction, using violence and causing social panic is not the legal definition of terrorism, nor is it close to any of the other many definitions of terrorism. This reflects how difficult it is to define terrorism, and why no agency such as the Police should be left to do so on their own terms. Defining terrorism is subjective and the Police, who have been the targets of protest violence leading on many occasions to officers losing self-control, have an emotional bias towards invoking the term. The definition of terrorism in any circumstances must be made after review by political leaders, the executive arm of government, the legislature, the department of justice, the police, and then ultimately decided by the courts.
What is absent in the political violence in Hong Kong is an organisation or conspiratorial cell structure or a collection of individuals motivated by a terrorist movement. The sad and clumsy bomb making efforts efforts of a few disenchanted and misguided young people in Hong Kong are not in any way similar to Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS, who are the real terrorists we know. This is not terrorism in Hong Kong.
About the author:
Martin Purbrick is a former Royal Hong Kong Police officer, whose work included counter terrorism in Special Branch and triad society research in the Criminal Intelligence Bureau from 1988 to 2000. For the past 18 years he has been employed by various major companies in corporate security roles and he now operates his own company.
文//Martin Purbrick（作者為前警官，於1988至2000年間，曾參與包括政治部的反恐工作及刑事情報科的三合會調查。過去18年間任職不同公司擔任保安事務，現時經營私人公司。）
翻譯//葉杏麗
編輯//馮少榮
from 也是這裡，也在這裡～ http://ktoyhk.blogspot.com/2020/03/20200322_28.html