維基解密的台灣版
（Ajin 開口）
非常感恩網友銘的寶貴報碼。
底下網址是維基解密的台灣版，由比利潘（ 潘 醫師）及一群人製作。他們搜尋危機解密有關台灣的資訊，並翻譯成漢字。
文件索引 Reference ID
|
標題 Topic
|
建立日 Created
|
解密日 Released
|
機密等級 Classification
|
出處使館 Origin
|
翻譯完成度
|
08TAIPEI171
|
郝龍彬幕僚爆料馬英九曾派密使要求中國配合以利總統大選
|
2008-02-04 09:30
|
2011-08-30 01:44
|
CONFIDENTIAL
|
美國在台協會
|
已完成
|
標題
郝龍斌幕僚爆料馬英九曾派密使要求中國配合以利總統大選
中文翻譯
概要
1. 在08年2月2日的一場會談裡,國民黨籍的台北市長郝龍斌向楊甦隸預測,馬英九會贏得總統選舉,但差距會遠比1月12日的立委選舉來的小,不過馬英九一定要採取攻勢以取勝,要了解敗選會是國民黨的災難.郝還說,國民黨不需要抵制兩個入聯公投案,因為選民認為那是假議題,不感興趣。(前)市長顧問莊文思說，馬陣營一直和中國有聯繫，要中國擱置像"海峽中線"那樣的爭議事項，並讓國台辦不發表一些會讓馬頭痛的談話，但莊沒有提供太多細節。郝龍斌答應,市府會盡一切努力,讓美國在台協會可以蓋新會館.
2. 楊甦隸在2月2日和國民黨及台北市長郝龍斌會面,台大教授兼市長顧問莊文思也同時與會.
板塊沒向國民黨移動
2. (C) 郝評論說,國民黨在立委選舉獲勝,主要是因為陳水扁還有大嘴巴的杜正勝,他接著說陳水扁將中正紀念堂改名或許催出深綠的票,但深藍也應抗議而出來投票.郝說,更重要的是,民進黨的動員方式讓游離選民反感,倒向國民黨的候選,立委選舉中兩黨政黨票的差距,要比立院區域選舉的席次接近,證明台灣選舉並沒出現板塊位移.郝預測馬會贏得選舉,但差距會遠比立委選舉小.
馬不能太小心
4. 郝評論說,馬如果在選戰的最後幾週內太過小心,就有可能輸.過去在2000年和2004年國民黨候選人連戰讓陳水扁掌握議題,反擊無力,儘管選前兩個月還領先20%(譯注: 聯合報民調? ), 最終還是輸掉大選,馬要贏一定要掌握攻勢.楊甦隸問說,如果馬太強勢,會否被認為太驕傲?郝回說,雖然民進黨想讓選民相信,一黨獨大的國民黨會賣台,但多數人不買帳,所以馬的強勢回擊風險很小.
國民黨輸掉總統會更慘
5. (C) 郝預測,總統選舉的敗選一方會很慘,如果民進黨輸,由於他們立委席次不到三分之一,在政壇上會沒什麼影響力,如果國民黨派出最受歡迎的馬英九還不能贏,也許會在20年內無法執政.郝說,國民黨沒培養出下一代的領導人,五十歲以下的人還身處低位,不算是可勝選的總統候選人選.不過,如果民進黨候選人謝長廷敗選,副總統候選人蘇貞昌可能會領導民進黨,在2012年選時捲土重來.
陳水扁下台後會對下屆總統造成困擾
6. 楊甦隸問郝龍斌，陳水扁總統五月下台後，可能會扮演何種角色？畢竟陳水扁的年紀比起李登輝在兩千年離任時，年輕了二十歲。郝回說，不管誰當選，下屆總統都會因陳感到頭痛。泛藍陣營會強烈要求馬英九起訴陳水扁，而如果謝長廷當選，阿扁們會要謝特赦陳。郝說，未來的總統在處理陳的問題時，需要有圓融智慧，否則陣營內部的矛盾會加深，總統個人也可能聲望下降。另外，對於郝龍彬的質疑，楊甦隸斷然表示，美國和陳水扁沒有討論政治庇護相關事宜，因為這種行為與美國的核心民主價值相衝突。
兩黨都低調
7. (C) 在三月二十二日的總統大選前，兩黨都不會打算再引起如中正紀念堂改名那樣的爭議，因為雙方都在立委選舉中，因為選民對這種招數的反感，而學到教訓。郝說，馬的競選團隊比較擔心，陳水扁和民進黨在總統選舉和五月就職前會有什麼動作。郝擔心，如果民進黨有什麼抗議行動，最有可能會在台北舉行。郝也擔心，如果謝敗選，陳可能會拒絕下台。楊甦隸說，他對台灣的民主制度有信心，兩任總統的交接將會很順利。
要中國轉向思考非易事
8. (C) 楊甦隸強調，台灣的下屆總統必須努力恢復因入聯公投爭議而受損的美台關係，同時，美國已呼籲中國對台灣加強合作，減少敵意。郝說，中國不斷壓縮台灣的國際生存空間，利用各種大小機會羞辱台灣。楊回說，如果兩岸關係要在台灣下任總統任內改善，中國必須要更有彈性。郝坦承，要兩岸關係改善，馬需要讓中國外交部有新的成效指標，讓中方的重點放在與台灣關係改善多少，而非讓台灣斷交國增加。
不用抵制公投
9. (C)郝預測，國民黨不會呼籲抵制公投，因為沒有這個必要，選民已瞭解台灣入聯是個民進黨為動員選民，創造出的「假議題」。和立委選舉同時舉行的討黨產、反貪腐公投未受迴響，僅有四成民進黨選民和一成國民黨選民參加。郝表示，在立委選前的一階段、二階段領票的爭議不會重演，因為妥協方案運作良好。郝的幕僚莊文思教授說，可能更重要的是，中國已從歷史學到教訓，對公投噤聲。莊文思說，馬英九也派出中間人，和中國私下討論，讓中國同意擱置具爭議性的「海峽中線航線」，並讓國台辦取消一場記者會，阻止了一些對馬英九選情不力的反台言論。
台北市長支持AIT遷址
10. (C) 最後，楊甦隸稱讚北市都發局，成功地讓未來的AIT大廈有可從後方進出的通道。楊說。美國政府已通過興建新大樓的預算，但還要等國會審查，如果一切順利，將可在一年內動工，五年內興建完成。郝說，希望他有機會和楊一起看著新大廈落成，市府會用一切必要手段，讓新大廈可以順利動工。
評語
11. (C) 如今天的對談所顯現出的，郝龍彬身為前新黨黨員、國民黨老軍頭郝柏村的兒子，對泛藍的事務算直言不韙。就像是說，馬團隊不斷否認他們有派中間人和中國聯絡，但被郝爆料。我們懷疑，真相會在兩造之間（譯注：老美認為馬有跟中國聯絡，但不確定細節是否是和郝龍彬與莊文思說的一樣）。
新聞報導和網路討論連結
本站領先所有中外媒體首先挖掘出此電文
原文出處
英文原文
SUBJECT: TAIPEI MAYOR HAU PREDICTS CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL RACE, CRISIS FOR KMT IF MA DEFEATED
Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Director on February 2, KMT Taipei mayor Hau Long-bin predicted Ma Ying-jeou will win the presidential election, but by a much smaller margin than the KMT landslide in the January 12 legislative elections. Ma must remain on the offensive to win, however, realizing that a presidential defeat will spell disaster for the KMT. The KMT will not need to boycott the UN referenda because voters are already uninterested in what they see as a "fake" issue, Hau suggested. The Ma campaign has been in touch with Beijing , mayoral advisor Prof. Zhuang Wen-si claimed without elaborating, securing PRC agreement to table controversial items like the "midline flight path" and problematic statements from the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office. The Taipei mayoral office will do "whatever is necessary" to help make the AIT new office building a reality, promised Hau. End Summary.
¶2. (C) The Director met with KMT Taipei mayor Hau Long-bin on February 2. Mayoral adviser Prof. Zhuang Wen-si of National Taiwan University also attended the meeting.
No Realignment in Favor of KMT
¶2. (C) The KMT should "thank" President Chen and his outspoken Education Minister Tu Cheng-sheng for its landslide victory in the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) elections, Hau remarked. Chen's campaign to rename the Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) Memorial may have energized the DPP's deep-Green base, he continued, but it also energized the deep-Blue protest vote. More importantly, Hau added, the DPP's divisive campaign tactics alienated "swing" voters, who ended up supporting KMT candidates. The January 12 "party vote," which broke more closely between the DPP and KMT than the division of LY district seats between the two parties, proves there has been no "realignment" in Taiwan politics, argued Hau. Ma will win the presidential election, he predicted, but by a much closer margin.
Ma Mustn't Be Too Cautious
¶4. (C) Ma will run the risk of losing the election if he is "too cautious" in the closing weeks of the race, opined Hau. In both the 2000 and 2004 elections, he continued, KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan let Chen dictate the campaign agenda. Lien fought back feebly, and ultimately lost the race despite a twenty-point lead just two months before the election. Ma must maintain an "offensive" campaign throughout the race if he is to win, concluded Hau. If Ma is too aggressive, asked the Director, would he come across as arrogant? While the DPP hopes to convince voters that an arrogant, too-powerful KMT would "sell out" Taiwan to the PRC, replied Hau, most voters disregard these accusations, so Ma risks little by hitting back.
Presidential Loss Worse for KMT
¶5. (C) A presidential defeat will have dire repercussions for the losing party, predicted Hau. If the DPP loses, they will have little political leverage, after winning less than a third of the LY. If the KMT cannot win with favorite-son Ma as its candidate, Hau continued, the KMT might not be able to retake power for "another twenty years." The KMT has failed to cultivate its next generation of leaders, Hau continued. No one younger than 50 has risen to the party's senior ranks, and no one at that level now is considered a viable presidential candidate. If DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) were to lose, however, his vice presidential running mate Su Tseng-chang could lead the DPP and would be able to launch a strong campaign against Ma in ¶2012.
Retired Chen a Problem for Successor
¶6. (C) The Director asked Hau what role President Chen might take after stepping down in May, noting that Chen would be twenty years younger than former president Lee Teng-hui was when he retired in 2000. Hau replied that Chen would be a "difficult decision" for the next president, whoever that is. Ma will be under enormous pressure from the Blue camp to prosecute Chen, and Chen loyalists within the DPP would pressure a President Hsieh to pardon him. In dealing with Chen, Hau continued, the future president must exercise great wisdom and tact; otherwise, inter-party hostility could intensify, and the office of the presidency itself could be harmed. In response to Hau's inquiry, the Director flatly ruled out the existence of any asylum discussions between Chen and the U.S. , noting that such dealings would contradict the U.S. 's core democratic values.
Both Parties Laying Low
¶7. (C) Before the March 22 election, predicted Hau, neither the DPP or KMT will want to rekindle controversies like the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial renaming, because both have been chastened by the public's rejection of such tactics in the LY elections. According to Hau, Ma's campaign team is more concerned about what Chen and the DPP might do in the time between the presidential election and the inauguration on May ¶20. If the DPP does stage some kind of protest, Hau worried, it will most likely happen in Taipei . Hau also expressed concern that Chen might refuse to step down if Hsieh is defeated. The Director expressed confidence that Taiwan 's democratic institutions are strong enough to ensure a smooth transition to the next president.
Changing Beijing 's Priorities Not Easy
¶8. (C) Taiwan's next president must work to restore U.S.-Taiwan relations, which have been damaged by the UN referendum controversy, the Director stressed. At the same time, he continued, the U.S. has urged China to adopt a more cooperative, less hostile approach toward Taiwan . China relentlessly pressures Taiwan 's international "living space," added Hau, taking any opportunity, no matter how small, to humiliate Taiwan . The PRC must adopt a more flexible attitude if cross-Strait relations are to improve under Taiwan 's next president, replied the Director. If Ma is elected, Hau agreed, this will only happen if Ma can convince the PRC Foreign Ministry to measure success in terms of improving relations with Taiwan , instead of further reducing the dwindling number of Taiwan 's diplomatic allies.
No Boycott Necessary
¶9. (C) The KMT will not urge a boycott of the UN referenda because it won't need to, Hau predicted. The voting public now understands that UN membership for Taiwan is a "fake issue" created by the DPP to drum up voter support. The LY election referenda failed miserably, Hau added, with only one-tenth of KMT and two-fifths of DPP voters participating. The "one-step/two-step" controversy which preceded the LY election will also not be a problem this time around, Hau continued, since the "compromise" procedure worked without a hitch. Perhaps most importantly, Prof. Zhuang noted, Beijing has learned from past mistakes, and has muted its opposition to the referenda. According to Zhuang, intermediaries from the Ma campaign have also been in quiet discussions with Beijing , securing PRC agreement to table the controversial "midline flight path" proposal and to cancel a Taiwan Affairs Office conference which might have generated unhelpful statements against Taiwan .
Taipei Mayor Backs NOB
¶10. (C) In closing, the Director complimented the Taipei Department of Urban Planning for reaching an acceptable resolution to the question of a rear access road for the new AIT office building (NOB). The Administration has approved the NOB construction budget, he continued, which now must pass Congress. If all goes well, groundbreaking on the NOB site could happen within a year, and construction of the NOB could be completed within five years. Hau stated he was eager to stand alongside the Director at a future groundbreaking ceremony, and that his office would do "whatever is necessary" to help make the NOB a reality.
Comment
¶11. (C) A former New Party member and son of an old-line KMT military leader, Hau can be outspoken about pan-Blue matters, as today's conversation demonstrates. For example, Ma and his advisers have consistently denied the sort of intermediary contacts with Beijing that Hau alleged in our meeting. The truth, we suspect, may be in between.
on 椰子樹下打盹的哲學家: http://tw.blog.yahoo.com/mesg/mesg.php?type=error&key=article_not_found